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 In the Name of Sovereignty?  The Battle over In Dubio Mitius  
Inside and Outside the Courts  
 
Christophe J. Larouer∗ 
 
Contrary to some prominent legal scholars’ predictions, the principle of in 
dubio mitius, that is, the principle of restrictive interpretation of treaty 
obligations in deference to the sovereignty of states, has not disappeared.  
Worse, the Appellate Body (AB) of the World Trade Organization (WTO) has 
carried it into the 21st Century, reigniting the ideological debate dividing the 
legal doctrine over the conception of what the relationship between domestic 
and international law should be.  Therefore, after retracing the history of this 
principle during which key legal figures opposed one another, this article 
examines the divergent positions defended by the proponents and opponents of 
in dubio mitius, including domestic and international courts, to demonstrate 
the isolation and weakness of the AB’s position towards this principle to the 
detriment of its legitimacy.  To this end, this article contributes to the broader 
discussion concerning states’ regulatory autonomy and the relevance of the 




   At the outset this article seeks to determine whether there is some 
evidence establishing the deliberate omission of the principle of in dubio 
mitius, that is, the principle of restrictive interpretation of treaty obligations in 
deference to the sovereignty of states, from the language of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT).1  Guided by Lord McNair’s 
suggestion to delve into the preparatory work of the 1956 Resolution upon the 
Interpretation of Treaties of the Institute of International Law (IIL) to find an 
answer to this question,2 this article shows that the division of the aforesaid 
resolution’s drafters over in dubio mitius transcended this principle and 
                                                          
∗
 S.J.D. Candidate and Fellow of the Institute of International Economic Law, 
Georgetown University Law Center.  Preliminary draft prepared for the Fifth Cornell 
Inter-University Graduate Conference, Cornell University School of Law, March 27-
28, 2009. 
1
 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969), 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, available 
at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/1_1_1969.pdf 
2
 See LORD MC NAIR, THE LAW OF TREATIES 766 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1961).  See also JOHN H. JACKSON, SOVEREIGNTY, THE WTO, AND CHANGING 
FUNDAMENTALS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 185 (Cambridge University Press, 2006) 
(emphasizing that “during the drafting of the [1956] Resolution upon the 
Interpretation of Treaties . . . the members were unable to come to an agreement as to 
mention of this rule, with the result that it does not appear in the resolution.”) 
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exposed differing conceptions of the purpose of treaty interpretation.3  
Partisans of the textual, objective or plain meaning approach4 – or what U.S. 
Supreme Court Justice Breyer calls the “literal text-based approach”5 – seem 
to favor the application of in dubio mitius to prevent judicial legislation,6 
whereas advocates of the subjective and teleological approaches to treaty 
interpretation have denounced its danger.7  However, neither school of 
thought has prevailed, for this ideological legal debate is still raging both at 
the international8 and domestic levels.9 To this end, the affirmation of the 
principle of in dubio mitius by the AB of the WTO in EC – Hormones as “an 
interpretative principle . . . widely recognized in international law”10 
perpetuates the legal controversy regarding a principle whose scope was 
already questioned by Roman jurisconsults.11 
 Although the omission of the principle of in dubio mitius from the VCLT 
originated in its drafters’ diverging conceptions of treaty interpretation, this 
principle did not disappear.  To the contrary, sixty years after Hersch 
                                                          
3
 See Francis Jacobs, Varieties of Approach to Treaty Interpretation: With Special 
Reference to the Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties Before the Vienna 
Diplomatic Conference, 18 INT. & COMP. L. Q. 318 (1969). 
4
 See Gerald Fitzmaurice, The Law and Procedure of the International Court of 
Justice 1951–4: Treaty Interpretation and Other Treaty Points, 33 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L 
L. 203 (1957). 
5
 STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC 
CONSTITUTION 85 (Knopf, 2005).  
6
 Golder v. United Kingdom, 18 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at para. 2 (1975) (separate 
opinion of Judge Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice). 
7
 See Sir Hersch Lauterpacht, Restrictive Interpretation and the Principle of 
Effectiveness in the Interpretation of Treaties, 26 Brit. Y.B. Int’l L. 56 (1949). 
8
 See e.g., Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Why States Create 
International Tribunals: A Response to Professors Posner and Yoo, 93(3) CALIF. L. 
REV. 48 (2008); Federico Ortino, Treaty Interpretation and the WTO Appellate Body 
Report in US – Gambling: A Critique, 9(1) J. INT. ECON. LAW 117, 146 (2006) 
(warning that “ignoring the contextual and teleological dimensions of treaty 
interpretation may undermine the legitimacy of WTO reports as well as of the WTO 
dispute settlement system as a whole.”); and Henrik Horn & Joseph Weiler, 
European Communities – Trade Description of Sardines: Textualism and its 
Discontent, in HENRIK HORN & PETROS C. MAVROIDIS ET AL., THE WTO CASE LAW 
OF 2002 253 (Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
9
 See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS 
AND THE LAW (Princeton University Press, 1997).  But cf. BREYER, n.____.  
10
 Appellate Body Report, EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products 
(EC – Hormones), WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R, adopted 16 January 1998, 
para. 165, n. 154. 
11
 Annuaire de l’Institut de Droit International, Quarante-sixième volume, Session 
de Grenade, Avril 1956, Quatrième question : De l’interprétation des traités, 
Rapporteur: Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, at 341 (Gutzwiller approving the elimination of 
the mention regarding restrictive interpretation, since Roman jurisconsults already 
could not agree on the scope to be given to this principle).  
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Lauterpacht warned against the repercussions of the recognition by the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) of the “theoretical relevance of the rule of 
restrictive interpretation,”12 the AB in EC – Hormones, in turn, has helped to 
keep this principle “alive in some arbitral awards, in the pleadings of the 
parties, and in the literature of international law.”13  Not only does this 
behavior undermine the role played by the WTO and multilateralism in 
international law, but it also discredits the prediction advanced by many that 
“[s]sovereignty” has lost its central place in international law.”14  
 If the repackaging of the debate concerning sovereignty into a discussion 
relating to nation-states’ regulatory autonomy15 exceeds the scope of this 
article, the persistence of in dubio mitius proves that the motives underlying 
unilateral state action are stronger than ever.  And the ability of the WTO to 
defeat this course remains dubious, for, unlike other international courts, the 
AB has carried this principle into the Twenty-First Century.16 
 This article will proceed as follows. Part II demonstrates how the principle 
of in dubio mitius was introduced in international law for the purpose of treaty 
interpretation and deliberately left out of the language of the VCLT.  Part III 
turns to the case law of the WTO and other international and domestic 
tribunals to expose not only the isolation of the AB’s position towards this 
principle, but also the weakness of its reasoning.  Part IV draws on the 
doctrinal reactions generated by the AB to transcend partisanship and discredit 
false claims, before Part V concludes. 
II.  Origin of the Principle of In Dubio Mitius 
 
                                                          
12
 Lauterpacht, supra, n.____, at 63.  
13
 Id.  
14
 Martti Koskenniemi, What Use for Sovereignty Today?, The Second Biennial 
General Conference of the Asian Society of International Law, International Law in a 
Multi-polar and Multi-civilizational World: Asian Perspectives, Challenges and 
Contributions, Tokyo, 1-2 August 2009, available at http://www.asiansil-
tokyo2009.com/pdf/abstract-koskenniemi.pdf.  See also Anne-Marie Slaughter, 
Disaggregated Sovereignty: Towards the Public Accountability of Global 
Government Networks, 39 GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION 159 (2004). 
15
 See, e.g., Armin von Bogdandy, Pluralism, direct effect, and the ultimate say: 
On the relationship between international and domestic constitutional law, 6(3) 
INT’L J. CON. L. 397 (2008); Michael Ming Du, Domestic Regulatory Autonomy 
under the TBT Agreement: From Non-discrimination to Harmonization, 6(2) 
CHINESE J. INT’L L. 269 (2007); and Joel P. Trachtman, Regulatory jurisdiction and 
the WTO, 10(3) J. INT. ECON. LAW 501 (2007).  
16
 Nearly every single legal article pertaining to the question of in dubio mitius has 
been triggered by the AB’s report in EC – Hormones.  See infra IV. Division of the 
Legal Doctrine on the Principle of In Dubio Mitius, at ___ and accompanying notes. 
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 In a nutshell, the “teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the 
various nations,”17 are responsible for incorporating a concept first used in 
domestic criminal and contract law in the area of treaty interpretation.  
A. When Was the Principle of In Dubio Mitius introduced in International 
 Law? 
1. A Criminal Law Principle 
 
     The principle of in dubio mitius originated in the Roman law maxim 
Semper in dubiis benigniora praeferenda sunt (i.e., in doubtful matters 
preference should always be given to the more benign [benevolent, liberal] 
solution).18  This maxim used in criminal cases19 evolved into the principle in 
dubio pro reo (i.e., when in doubt, in favor of the accused),20 which is better 
known as the presumption of innocence.21  Francis Wharton was the first 
                                                          
17
 Article 38(1)(c)(d) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. 
18
 The Corpus Iuris of Emperor Justinian (529-533 A.D.), Legal Maximes: Digest 
Book 50 Chapter 17, Dig.50.17.56, Gaius 3 de legatis ad ed. urb. 
19
 See Fabio Lopez-Lazaro, ‘No Deceit Safe in Its Hiding Place’: The Criminal 
Trial in Eighteenth-Century Spain, 20 (3) LAW AND HISTORY REV. 33 (2002). 
20
 The in dubio pro reo principle is still expressly used in the decisions of the 
Court of Justice of the European Communities (ECJ).  See, e.g., Case C62/06 ZF 
Zefeser [2007] ECR I607, at para. 11; and Case T-43/02 Jungbunzlauer v. 
Commission [2006] OJC-294/41, at para.  142.  
21
 For a series of references and decisions illustrating the correlation between the 
principles of in dubio pro reo (i.e., when in doubt, in favor of the accused) and the 
presumption of innocence, see, e.g., JAMES Q. WHITMAN, THE ORIGINS OF 
REASONABLE DOUBT: THEOLOGICAL ROOTS OF THE CRIMINAL TRIAL 122 (Yale 
University Press, 2008); MICHAEL BOHLANDER, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF INSTITUTIONS AND PROCEDURES 106 (Cameron 
May, 2007); FRANCIS JACOBS, THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 
113 (Oxford University Press, 1975) (noting that “[w]hat the principle of the 
presumption of innocence requires here is first that the court should not be 
predisposed to find the accused guilty, and second that it should at all times give the 
accused the benefit of the doubt, on the rule in dubio pro reo.”); M. H. D. v. the 
International Telecommunication Union, 97th Session, Judgment No. 2351, at 11 
(Int’l Lab. Org. Admi. Trib. 2004) (finding that “[c]ontrary to what the ITU 
maintains, however, the burden of proof rests with the Administration, since the 
complainant must enjoy a presumption of innocence and the protection afforded by 
the principle in dubio pro reo.”); and Prosecutor v. Fatmir Limaj, Haradin Bala and 
Isak Musliu, Case No. IT-03-66-A (Int’l Crim. Trib. for Former Yugoslavia 2007) 
(stating that “[t]he Appeals Chamber is satisfied that the principle of in dubio pro 
reo, as a corollary to the presumption of innocence, and the burden of proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt,21 applies to findings required for conviction, such as those which 
make up the elements of the crime charged.”) 
5 In the Name of Sovereignty? [2009 
 
scholar to use in dubio mitius in the context of international law.22  However, 
the principle was still limited to the area of international criminal law.23 
2. First Attempts to Use In Dubio Mitius to Interpret Ambiguous Treaty 
 Provisions  
 
     McNair reproduced a Report by the King’s Advocate dated 3 February 
1835 in which the use of in dubio mitius was advanced to interpret the terms 
“warlike stores” contained in a treaty signed in London in 1834 between Great 
Britain, France, Spain and Portugal.  The relevant passage of this report reads 
as follows:  
 
I have the Honor to report that, in the interpretation of Treaties, the 
terms of which are vague and indefinite, whatever tends to destroy the 
equality of a Contract, and to lay a burthen upon one only of the 
contracting parties, must be construed in a strict and limited sense, and 
that the obligation is not to be extended beyond what is actually 
expressed . . . .24 
  
 Lassa Oppenheim was the first scholar to have advocated the application 
of in dubio mitius for the interpretation of treaty provisions whose meanings 
are ambiguous.  The language used then by Oppenheim will pass the test of 
time, as the AB in EC – Hormones will use the exact same words when 
referring to in dubio mitius. To that end, compare the similarity between 
Oppenheim’s comments on in dubio mitius and footnote 154 of the AB’s 
report in EC – Hormones.   
 
 According to Oppenheim: 
 
The principle in dubio mitius must be applied interpreting treaties.  If, 
therefore, the meaning of a stipulation is ambiguous, the meaning is to 
be preferred which is less onerous for the obliged party, or which 
interferes less with the parties’ territorial and personal supremacy, or 
which contains less general restrictions upon the parties.25 (emphasis 
                                                          
22
 See FRANCIS WHARTON, COMMENTARIES ON LAW, EMBRACING CHAPTERS ON 
THE NATURE, THE SOURCE, AND THE HISTORY OF LAW; ON INTERNATIONAL LAW, 
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE; AND ON CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY LAW 764 (Kay 
and brother, 1884) 
23
 See, e.g., JOHN BASSETT MOORE & FRANCIS WHARTON, A DIGEST OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: AS EMBODIED IN DIPLOMATIC DISCUSSIONS, TREATIES AND 
OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS, INTERNATIONAL AWARDS, THE DECISIONS 
OF MUNICIPAL COURTS, AND THE WRITINGS OF JURISTS 335 (G.P.O., 1906). 
24
 See MC NAIR, supra, n.____, at 462.  
25
 LASSA OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE 561 (vol. 1, 
Longmans, Green, 1905).  




     As for footnote 154 of the AB’s report in EC – Hormones, it reads in part: 
 
The principle of in dubio mitius applies in interpreting treaties, in 
deference to the sovereignty of states. If the meaning of a term is 
ambiguous, that meaning is to be preferred which is less onerous to the 
party assuming an obligation, or which interferes less with the 
territorial and personal supremacy of a party, or involves less general 
restrictions upon the parties.26  (emphasis added) 
3. Lauterpacht’s Decisive Contribution  
 
     If Oppenheim advocated the use of in dubio mitius to interpret ambiguous 
treaty provisions in deference to the sovereign state assuming the obligation, 
Lauterpacht legitimized - probably against his will - its use by admitting its 
existence and supporting his observations by citing Francis Wharton’s work.27 
Therefore, although Hersch Lauterpacht cautioned against the use of in dubio 
mitius in treaty interpretation and denounced the danger of “restrictive 
interpretation of obligations as a general principle of law” (i.e., in dubio 
mitius),28 he constitutes the missing link between the legal maxim in force 
under Emperor Justinian and the finding of the AB in EC – Hormones.    
B. Why Was the Principle of In Dubio Mitius Left Out of the VCLT? 
1. Preparatory Work of the VCLT: A Dead-End 
 
     First, it is worthy to note that the principle of in dubio mitius was never 
once referred to in the preparatory work of the VCLT.  The only implicit 
allusion to such a principle pertained to the use of maxims in treaty 
interpretation, which was made in the commentaries to Article 28 of the 1966 
Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with commentaries:   
 
(3) Most cases submitted to international adjudication involve the 
interpretation of treaties, and the jurisprudence of international 
tribunals is rich in reference to principles and maxims of 
interpretation. In fact, statements can be found in the decisions of 
international tribunals to support the use of almost every principle or 
maxim of which use is made in national systems of law in the 
interpretation of statutes and contracts. Treaty interpretation is, of 
                                                          
26
 See EC – Hormones, supra, n.____. 
27
 See HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, PRIVATE LAW SOURCES AND ANALOGIES OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO ARBITRATION 178 (The 
Lawbook Exchange , Ltd, 2002) (reprint of 1927 ed.) 
28
 See Lauterpacht, supra, n.____, at 59.  
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course, equally part of the everyday work of Foreign Ministries. 
 
(4) Thus, it would be possible to find sufficient evidence of recourse to 
principles and maxims in international practice to justify their 
inclusion in a codification of the law of treaties, if the question were 
simply one of their relevance on the international plane. But the 
question raised by jurists is rather as to the non-obligatory character 
of many of these principles and maxims. They are, for the most part, 
principles of logic and good sense valuable only as guides to assist in 
appreciating the meaning which the parties may have intended to 
attach to the expressions that they employed in a document. Their 
suitability for use in any given case hinges on a variety of 
considerations which have first to be appreciated by the interpreter of 
the document; the particular arrangement of the words and sentences, 
their relation to each other and to other parts of the document, the 
general nature and subject-matter of the document, the circumstances 
in which it was drawn up, etc. Even when a possible occasion for their 
application may appear to exist, their application is not automatic but 
depends on the conviction of the interpreter that it is appropriate in the 
particular circumstances of the case. In other words, recourse to many 
of these principles is discretionary rather than obligatory and the 
interpretation of documents is to some extent an art, not an exact 
science.29  (emphasis added) 
 
     Needless to say, the caution expressed by the VCLT’s drafters was such 
that even the use of maxims in treaty interpretation was depleted of all 
meaning.  In this context, as McNair underlined, the examination of the 
preparatory work of the 1956 Resolution upon the Interpretation of Treaties of 
the IIL explains why the principle of in dubio mitius was left out of the 
language of the VCLT.   
 2. Preparatory Work of the 1956 Resolution upon the Interpretation of 
 Treaties of the IIL: The Answer 
 
     Between 1950 and 1956, the members of the IIL’s committee in charge of 
the resolution regarding the interpretation of treaties were not able to come to 
an agreement regarding notably the rule of restrictive interpretation (i.e., in 
dubio mitius).  As a result, no mention of this rule was made in the final 
resolution of the IIL adopted in Granada in April 1956. Analyzing the work of 
the IIL, Christian Tomuschat reached the conclusion that:  
  
                                                          
29
 International Law Commission, Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with 
commentaries, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1966/add. 1., 2 YBK. INT’L L. COMM’N 
218 (1966).  
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This outcome of the deliberation (of the International Law 
Commission) may be assessed as more than just an accidental event. It 
demonstrates that the sovereign State today is not anymore the core 
value of international community. It has become clear that conditions 
of peace and security in international society require a collective effort 
on part of all States so that restrictions to sovereignty pertain to the 
normal picture of international relations and cannot be termed as 
unusual exception.30 
 
      Before delving into the details of the preparatory work of this committee, 
one must observe that the special rapporteurs on the Law of Treaties of the 
International Law Commission (ILC) were also the rapporteurs to the IIL, 
which demonstrates the extent to which the debate that took place within the 
IIL affected the VCLT. 
 The deliberation of the IIL is foremost the confrontation of two men and 
two conceptions of treaty interpretation.  On the hand, Lauterpacht, a strong 
advocate of the subjective approach,31 provided the IIL with the initial report 
upon which the resolution should have been adopted.  On the other hand, 
Gerald Fitzmaurice, a defender of the textual approach,32 singled-handedly put 
an end to the debate after replacing Lauterpacht who had resigned to become a 
judge at the ICJ.  This confrontation played out in the key four reports of the 
IIL that led to the adoption of the 1956 Resolution upon the Interpretation of 
Treaties.33 
(a) Bath – September 1950 
 
     Lauterpacht’s report accompanying his first project of resolution on the 
interpretation of treaties to the IIL is systematic and resolute.  He did not 
hesitate to marginalize some of the committee’s members’ favorable 
conception of the principle of restrictive interpretation (e.g., Profs. 
Guggenheim’s, Podesta Costa’s, and Rouseau’s).  To this end, it is interesting 
to note that the AB in EC – Hormones cited Prof. Rousseau to support the 
recognition of the principle of in dubio mitius as an interpretative principle 
“widely recognized in international law.”34 
      For Lauterpacht, the principle of restrictive interpretation sometimes 
appeared in domestic law, in the area of contract interpretation, under the form 
of the principle of in dubio mitius (i.e., “a presumption according to which the 
meaning of an ambiguous contract stipulation to be preferred is the least 
                                                          
30
 Christian C. Tomuschat, International Law: Ensuring the survival of mankind 
on the eve of a new century, 281 R.C.A.D.I. 171 (1999). 
31
 See Mitchell, supra, n.____. 
32
 See Fitzmaurice, supra, n.____. 
33
 The views expressed in these reports, which are available in French only, are 
the result of my translation and do not represent the official view of the IIL. 
34
  See EC – Hormones, supra, n.____. 
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onerous to the debtor of the obligation.”)35 Please note that this explicit 
reference to the actual words in dubio mitius were used only once during the 
entire process of the IIL’s Resolution upon the Interpretation of Treaties.  
Lauterpacht emphasized (i) that the principle of in dubio mitius “was not an 
absolute rule of interpretation in private law;”36 and (ii) that the 
“exaggerations of the maxim in dubio mitius were amplified by considerations 
inferred from the sovereignty of states.”37 
      Notwithstanding the intrinsic value of in dubio mitius, Lauterpacht 
demonstrated that several rules of treaty interpretation were contradictory and 
mutually exclusive,38 including the principles of in dubio mitius and 
effectiveness or effet utile.39 He illustrated his observation by several 
decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court40 and the Permanent Court of 
International Justice (PCIJ)41 in which these tribunals had chosen to apply the 
effectiveness principle over the principle of restrictive interpretation.  Note 
that the AB seems to have followed in the steps of these tribunals.42 
      The work of the committee on the interpretation of treaties was concluded 
by a series of reactions to Lauterpacht’s report, several of them diverging with 
his conception of the restrictive interpretation principle.  Thus, Sir Eric 
Beckett deplored that too little value was given to various canons of 
interpretation, including the presumption against restrictions on sovereignty 
(i.e., in dubio mitius), which are found in the books or in judicial or arbitral 
decisions.43  
(b) Sienna – April 1952 
 
      Lauterpacht deemed it important to reproduce excerpts of some the 
committee’s members’ letters that he received in 1951, for instance Max 
Huber’s letter describing the circumstances under which the principle of 
                                                          
35
 Annuaire de l’Institut de Droit International, Quarante-troisième volume, Tome 
I, Session de Bath, Septembre 1950, Rapport et projet de Résolutions présentées par 
M. H. Lauterpacht, at 402.  
36
 Id. at 403. 
37
 Id.  
38
 Id. at 372, 412.  
39
 Id. at 372. 
40
 See Nielsen v. Johnson, 279 U.S. 47 (1929).  
41
 See, e.g., Acquisition of Polish Nationality, 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 7, at 17 
(Sept. 15); Competence of the ILO in regard to International Regulation of the 
Conditions of the Labour of Persons Employed in Agriculture, 1922 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) 
No. 2 (Aug. 12); and Competence of the ILO to Regulate Incidentally the Personal 
Work of the Employer, 1926 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 13, (July 23). 
42
 See infra (c) The Flaw of Footnote 154, at ___, and (d) Unsolved Questions, at 
___ and accompanying notes. 
43
 See Annuaire de l’Institut de Droit International, supra, n.____, at 437.  
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restrictive interpretation is “natural.”44  For him, this principle is particularly 
justified to interpret treaties where only one party dominates the treaty 
making-process to the detriment of the parties’ common intention.45 As a 
result, the definitive project of Resolutions presented by Lauterpacht 
undermined the principle of restrictive interpretation by emphasizing that:  
 
As demonstrated by the international judicial and arbitral 
jurisprudence, the principle of restrictive interpretation plays an 
insignificant role in practice; its legitimacy in the doctrine is most 
questionable.  There is no reason to use it unless in the extreme case 
where there are no other means to establish the parties’ common 
intention.  To that end, there is no difference between the clauses 
conferring competence to the international tribunals and the other 
treaties’ provisions.46 
 
      Lauterpacht conceded that “it will be impossible to prevent the parties 
from arguing that any clause limiting sovereignty must be interpreted 
restrictively.”47  However, he affirmed that “de lege lata, the rule of restrictive 
interpretation has barely any practical importance.”48 I believe that he 
underestimated the attraction represented by this principle when he concluded 
that this principle could be used “only when all of the other methods of 
interpretation turned out to be insufficient,”49 which constitutes a situation that 
“will likely never happen.”50 
     It did not take long for criticisms to start flooding in.  Fitzmaurice led 
them, emphasizing that “the rule of restrictive interpretation plays a 
significant part in the negotiation of treaties where the parties lay down rules 
that more or less depart from general international law.”51 He later added that 
“the rule of restrictive interpretation plays a primordial part in the negotiation 
of treaties because treaty negotiations are always conducted with the 
knowledge that interpretation of the texts will be restrictive.”52 Guggenheim 
urged the IIL to select one of the two existing conceptions of the rule of 
restrictive interpretation without trying to reconcile them.53 According to him, 
                                                          
44
 Annuaire de l’Institut de Droit International, Quarante-quatrième volume, 
Tome I, Session de Sienne, Avril 1952, Observations complémentaires et projet 
définitif de résolutions présentées par M. H. Lauterpacht, at 201. 
45
 Id.  
46
 Id. at 223.  
47
 Annuaire de l’Institut de Droit International, Quarante-quatrième volume, 
Tome II, Session de Sienne, Avril 1952, Troisième question, De l’interprétation des 
traités, Rapporteur : M. H. Lauterpacht, at 364. 
48






 Id. at 370.  
52
 Id. at 395.  
53
 Id.  
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the first conception of this rule “consists in admitting the least onerous 
obligation deriving from the text of a treaty assumed by a party,”54 while the 
second conception defended by late judge Anzilotti considers restrictive 
interpretation as “the adoption of the narrowest meaning of the terms.”  
Notwithstanding the choice made by the IIL, Guggenheim recommended that 
“the principle of restrictive interpretation must receive different applications 
depending on the nature and object of the treaties in question.”55  
      In this context, Paul de la Pradelle’s intervention epitomized the motives 
having led to the elimination of the rule of restrictive interpretation from the 
IIL’s Resolution upon the Interpretation of Treaties, for he preferred that this 
rule not be mentioned in spite of its value because of the “fundamental 
disagreement opposing the rapporteur (i.e., Lauterpacht) and Fitzmaurice.”56 
In order to dissipate any misunderstanding, he explained that Lauterpacht 
“was against restrictive interpretation,”57 whereas Fitzmaurice “saw in it a 
fundamental principle.”58 Another committee’s member, Bourquin, reused de 
la Pradelles’s comment word for word.   
(c) Aix-en-Provence – April/May 1954 
 
      Lauterpacht summarized the various positions expressed by the different 
committee’s members towards his examination of the principle of restrictive 
interpretation in his report.  Therefore, he found that Basdevant, Bourquin, 
and Fitzmaurice had found “the project too radical, inasmuch it minimizes the 
importance of the principle.”59  He noted that Basdevant, Scelle, Bourquin, 
and Guggenheim wanted to insist more on the purpose and object of 
treaties.”60 Finally, he observed that Guggenheim and Fitzmaurice sought to 
specify the meaning of the principle.”61 More generally, Lauterpacht noted 
that “there was a complete disagreement on (i) the need to mention the 
principle; and (ii) the importance of the principle,”62 and that “no proposal of 
compromise, amendments or new drafts were suggested.”63  
(d) Granada – April 1956 
 
                                                          
54








 Id.  
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 Annuaire de l’Institut de Droit International, Quarante-cinquième volume, 
Tome I, Session d’Aix-en-Provence, Résumé de la question de l’interprétation des 
traités à l’issue du débat de Sienne, Avril/Mai 1954, at 230.  
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  Id.  
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      After Aix-en-Provence, the process seemed stalled, but an important event 
will affect the debate regarding the scope of the restrictive interpretation 
principle forever: Lauterpacht resigned from the IIL – and the ILC – to 
become a judge at the ICJ and was replaced in both instances by Fitzmaurice.  
The result of this change was going to be immediate and unequivocal, as 
Fitzmaurice announced that he would be “preferable to drop the articles,” 
which had been controversial up until then (e.g., the principle of restrictive 
interpretation).  He justified his position by saying that the new principles of 
interpretation “will not be able to be contested.”  Surprisingly, he noted that 
“it would be dangerous to mention the principle of restrictive interpretation in 
the Resolution of the Institute (IIL).”  Yet he added that “the Institute should 
not give its approval to texts introducing the idea that one can confer to a text 
a scope broader than what the parties intended it to be.”  The juxtaposition of 
these two ideas shows how Fitzmaurice put an end to a long controversy about 
the restrictive interpretation while managing to keep this principle’s spirit 
alive.  The following examination of the case law of different international 
and domestic tribunals proves this point. 
      It is interesting to note that six members of the IIL’s committee, including 
Guggenheim, abstained from voting on Fitzmaurice’s resolution. 
III. The Principle of In Dubio Mitius before the Courts 
 
      In 1958 Lauterpacht foresaw that the rule of restrictive interpretation 
would die out.64  Three years later, McNair corroborated this view by stating 
that the “so-called rule of restrictive interpretation . . . is believed to be now of 
declining importance and the time may be not far distant when it will 
disappear from the books.”65  Up until the report of the AB in EC – 
Hormones, these predictions seemed to have been correct.  However, contrary 
to the widespread doctrinal view accepting the extinction of in dubio mitius,66 
this article shows how the AB along with other domestic and international 
tribunals has carried this principle into the twenty-first century; so much that 
the principle of restrictive interpretation resurfaced in the recent conclusions 
of the ILC relating to unilateral acts of states.67 
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 See John H. Knox, The Judicial Resolution of Conflicts Between Trade and the 
Environment, 28 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 63 (2004).  
65
 MCNAIR, supra, n.____, at 765.  
66
 See Rudolf Bernhardt, Evolutive Treaty Interpretation, Especially of the 
European Convention on Human Rights, 42 GERM. Y.B. INT’L L. 14 (1999) 
(emphasizing that in dubio mitius “is no longer relevant, it is neither mentioned in the 
Vienna Convention, nor has it ever been invoked in the recent jurisprudence of 
international courts and tribunals.  Treaty obligations are in case of doubt and in 
principle not to be interpreted in favor of State sovereignty.”) 
67
 See Report of the Working Group of the International Law Commission: 
Conclusions of the International Law Commission relating to Unilateral Acts of 
States, U.N. GAOR, 58th Sess., at 4, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.703 (2006) (paragraph 7 
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A. The Pre-Hormones Legal Landscape 
1. The PCIJ and the ICJ 
 
     From the outset, it is worthy to emphasize that all the judgments of both 
the PCIJ68 and the ICJ are posterior to the introduction of in dubio mitius in 
international law by the legal doctrine.  Furthermore, as the Harvard Research 
in International Law noted, the PCIJ “has formulated relatively few rules of 
interpretation, and that it has usually stated them with such qualifications as to 
leave itself completely free to apply them or not accordingly as the 
circumstances and evidence in a particular case may require.”69 
(a) The Ideology: The Lotus Case 
 
      The Lotus case70 is often deemed to have established a presumption of 
state sovereignty,71 embodying the then PCIJ’s voluntarist conception of 
international society,72 that is, the doctrinal movement seeking “to assure the 
guarantee of the sovereignty of each state.”73  The relevant passage of this 
judgment reads as follows: 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
reading: “A unilateral declaration entails obligations for the formulating State only if 
it is stated in clear and specific terms. In the case of doubt as to the scope of the 
obligations resulting from such a declaration, such obligations must be interpreted in 
a restrictive manner.”) 
68
 For summaries of the jurisprudence of the PCIJ relative to the interpretation of 
treaties, see, e.g., Charles Cheney Hyde, Interpretation of Treaties by the Permanent 
Court of International Justice, 24 AM. J. INT'L L. 1-19 (1930); and Sir (William) Eric 
Beckett, Decisions of the Permanent Court of International Justice, 11 BRIT. Y.B. 
INT’L L. 1 (1930). 
69
 Harvard Research in International Law, Draft Convention on the Law of 
Treaties, 29 AM. J. INT'L L. 943 (Supp) (1935).  
70
 The Case of the S.S. “Lotus” (hereinafter The Lotus case], 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) 
No. 10 (Sept. 7) (holding that Turkey could apply its criminal laws to any foreigner 
who committed an offense outside of Turkey while harming Turkey or its subjects). 
For further references about the Lotus case, see, e.g., J.L. Brierly, The Lotus Case, 44 
L.Q.R. 155 (1928); and Ole Spiermann, Lotus and the double structure of 
international legal argument, in L. BOISSON DE CHAZOURNES & PH. SANDS, 
INTERNATIONAL LAW, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AND NUCLEAR 
WEAPONS 137 (Cambridge University Press, 1999).  
71
 See, e.g., KARL MATTHIAS MEESSEN, EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION IN 
THEORY AND PRACTICE 84 (Martinus Nijhoff, 1996); and MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, 
FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA: THE STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL 
ARGUMENT 220 (Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
72
 Brigitte Stern, Custom at the Heart of International Law, from MÉLANGES 
OFFERTS À PAUL REUTER 479-99 (Paris: Pedone, 1981) (trans. Michael Byers & Anne 
Denise), 11 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 89, 106 (2001). 
73
 Id. at 102. 
2009] In the Name of Sovereignty? 14    
 
International law governs relations between independent states. The 
rules of law binding upon states therefore emanate from their own free 
will as expressed in conventions or by usages generally accepted as 
expressing principles of law and established in order to regulate the 
relations between these coexisting independent communities or with a 
view to the achievement of common aims. Restrictions upon the 
independence of states cannot therefore be presumed.74  (emphasis 
added) 
 
The ideology vehicled by this judgment is encapsulated in the last 
sentence of the aforementioned excerpt, for the Kingdom of Belgium 
recently argued in a reply made before the Permanent Court of Arbitration 
(PCA): 
 
It is the last phrase of this quote, which has been interpreted as 
consecrating a ‘presumption of sovereignty’. Yet, as J.L. Brierly 
pointed out when the judgment was rendered, if restrictions upon the 
independence of states cannot be presumed, “neither, it may be said, 
can the absence of restrictions; for we are not entitled to deduce the 
law applicable to a specific state of facts from the mere fact of 
sovereignty or independence.75 
 
      However, even before the Lotus case, which the majority of writers 
viewed as presenting “a lethal danger to the future of international law,”76 the 
PCIJ had identified the principle of in dubio mitius as meaning that "if the 
wording of a treaty provision is not clear, in choosing between several 
admissible interpretations, the one which involves the minimum of obligations 
for the parties should be adopted."77  It is important nevertheless to mitigate 
this result by noting that the first decade of the 20th century was dominated by 
a predominance of bilateral, contractual treaties and a very limited number of 
multilateral law making treaties.78 
(b) The Judgments Enhancing In Dubio Mitius 
 
                                                          
74
 See The Lotus case, supra, n.____, at 18.  
75
 Iron Rhine ("Ijzeren Rijn") Railway (Belgium v. Netherlands), Reply of the 
Kingdom of Belgium, Perm. Ct. Arbitration, 10 March 2004, at 18, available at 
http://www.pca-cpa.org/upload/files/BE Reply.pdf 
76
 Prosper Weill, The Court cannot Conclude Definitively . . . Non Liquet 
Revisited, 36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 109 (1998). 
77
 See Interpretation of Article 3, Paragraph 2 of the Treaty of Lausanne (Frontier 
between Turkey and Iraq), 1925 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 12, at 25 (Nov. 21). 
78
 See Joseph H. H. Weiler, The Geology of International Law - Governance, 
Democracy and Legitimacy, 64 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR AUSLÄNDISCHES ÖFFENTLICHES 
RECHT UND VÖLKERRECHT (ZAÖRV) 547, 549 (2004).  
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     There are at least two decisions in the case regarding the Free Zones 
between France and Switzerland in which the PCIJ unambiguously stated that 
“in case of doubt, a limitation of sovereignty must be construed 
restrictively.”79 
(c) The Judgments Undermining In Dubio Mitius 
 
      In its first judgment, the Wimbledon case between Germany and Poland, 
the PCIJ held that: 
 
Germany has to submit to an important limitation of the exercise of the 
sovereign rights which no one disputes that she possesses over the Kiel 
Canal.  But the Court feels obliged to stop at the point where the so-
called restrictive interpretation would be contrary to the plain terms of 
the article and would destroy what has been clearly granted.80 
 
      Six years later, the PCIJ still addressed the principle of restrictive 
interpretation cautiously in Territorial Jurisdiction of the International 
Commission of the River Oder, for it found that: 
  
This argument, though sound in itself, must be employed only with the 
greatest caution. To rely upon it is not sufficient that the purely 
grammatical analysis of a text should not lead to definitive results; 
there are many other methods of interpretation, in particular reference 
is properly had to the principles underlying the matters to which the 
text refers; it will be only when, in spite of all pertinent considerations, 
the intention of the Parties still remains doubtful, that that 
interpretation should be adopted which is most favourable to the 
freedom of States.81 
 
      Lauterpacht characterized the recourse to restrictive interpretation by the 
PCIJ only if all other methods of interpretation had failed as a “frequent 
feature of the jurisprudence of the Court.”82  For him, a good illustration of 
this jurisprudence was the Advisory Opinion concerning the Polish Postal 
Service in Danzig in which the PCIJ held that:  
 
 In the opinion of the Court, the rules as to a strict or liberal 
construction of treaty stipulations can be applied only in cases where 
                                                          
79
 Case of the Free Zones of Upper Savoy and the District of Gex (second phase), 
1930 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 24, at 12 (Dec. 6); Case of the Free Zones of Upper Savoy 
and the District of Gex, 1932 P.C.I.J. (ser. A./B.) No. 46, at 167 (June 7).  
80
 The S.S. “Wimbledon”, 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 01, at 24-25 (Jan. 16). 
81
 Case relating to the Territorial Jurisdiction of the International Commission of 
the River Oder, 1929 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No 23, at 26 (Sept. 10). 
82
 Lauterpacht, supra, n.____, at 61.  
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ordinary methods of interpretation have failed.83 
(d) The Ambiguous Judgments  
 
      The ICJ in the Nuclear Tests Case stated that when a State assumes legal 
obligations by way of unilateral declaration “a restrictive interpretation is 
called for.”84  Tomuschat tempered this finding by saying that: 
 
[T]his pronouncement does not prove, however, that still today the ICJ 
clings to the traditional doctrine. Only exceptionally can States be 
bound by unilateral declarations they have made publicly, namely 
when there exists a manifest intent to enter into a legal commitment.  
Great caution is required to sustain such conclusion, in particular 
because the State concerned receives no consideration.  Normally 
States assume legal obligation on the base of reciprocity. A treaty as a 
bilateral instrument, embodying an undertaking of give and take, 
cannot be compared with a unilateral declaration . . . .85 
 
     On this particular point regarding the application of the restrictive 
interpretation principle to treaties, Lauterpacht emphasized that in dubio 
mitius “in so far as it implies an interpretation unfavourable to the recipient of 
benefits under the contract and one which is less onerous to the party 
burdened with an obligation, is not a general principle of law”86 and “quite 
independently of the fact that its merits do not seem to be as apparent as is 
generally assumed . . . is open to the objection that it does not take into 
account the benefits which the party bound by the commitment has reaped in 
consideration of its undertaking.”87  (emphasis added)  
2. The ECtHR 
(a) The Rejection of In Dubio Mitius: Golder v. United Kingdom 
 
      In Golder, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) read in Article 
6 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), which guarantees a 
fair trial, the right of access to a court without any textual support for (or 
against) such a right.88 It construed this provision “by emphasizing the rule-of-
law object and purpose of the Convention, and rejecting the idea that a law-
making treaty such as the ECHR should be interpreted in dubio mitius [i.e. 
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 Polish Postal Service in Danzig, 1925 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 11, at 39 (May 16). 
84
 Nuclear Tests Case (Australia v. France), 1974 I.C.J. 253, 267 (Dec. 20).   
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 See Christian C. Tomuschat, supra, n.____. 
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 See Golder v. United Kingdom (separate opinion of Judge Sir Gerald 
Fitzmaurice), supra, n.____, at para. 18. 
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restrictively].”89  
      The European Commission of Human Rights had previously reached the 
same conclusion in this case, accepting the position of the applicant (i.e, 
Sydney Elmer Golder) that “the ‘extended’ meaning [of art. 6 (1) of the 
ECHR] should be preferred to the ‘restricted’ one put forward by the 
government.”90  The Commission justified its conclusion by arguing that 
“[t]he decisive consideration here must be that the overriding function of this 
Convention is to protect the rights of the individual and not to lay down as 
between States mutual obligations which are to be restrictively interpreted 
having regard to the sovereignty of these States.”91 
      Nevertheless, Fitzmaurice, who was a judge of the ECtHR at the time, 
dissented in this case, implying the Court’s illegitimate interpretative process: 
 
I am quite unable to agree with the Court on what has been the 
principal issue of law in these proceedings, - namely that of the 
applicability, and interpretation, of article 6, paragraph1 (art. 6-1), of 
the Convention - the question of the alleged right of access to the 
courts - the point here being, not whether the Convention ought to 
provide for such a right, but whether it actually does.  This is 
something that affects the whole question of what is legitimate by way 
of the interpretation of an international treaty while keeping within the 
confines of a genuinely interpretative process, and not trespassing on 
the area of what may border on judicial legislation.92 (emphasis added) 
 
      Almost twenty years after his report to the IIL on the interpretation of 
treaties, and ten years after his report to the ILC on the law of treaties, 
Fitzmaurice had not changed his hostile position towards the principle of 
restriction.  For him: 
 
These various factors could justify even a somewhat restrictive 
interpretation of the Convention but, without going as far as that, they 
must be said, unquestionably, not only to justify, but positively to 
demand, a cautious and conservative interpretation, particularly as 
regards any provisions the meaning of which may be uncertain, and 
where extensive constructions might have the effect of imposing upon 
the contracting States obligations they had not really meant to assume, 
                                                          
89
 Jonas Bering Liisberg, Does the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights Threaten 
the Supremacy of Community Law? Article 53 of the Charter: a fountain of law or 
just an inkblot? (Harvard Jean Monnet Working Paper 04/01), available at 
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 Sidney Elmer Golder against the United Kingdom, App. No. 4451/70, 16 Eur. 
Comm’n H.R. (ser. B) at 31 (1973) (Commission report).  
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 Golder v. United Kingdom (separate opinion of Judge Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice), 
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or would not have understood themselves to be assuming.  Any serious 
doubt must therefore be resolved in favour of, rather than against, the 
government concerned, - and if it were true, as the Judgment of the 
Court seeks to suggest, that there is no serious doubt in the present 
case, then one must wonder what it is the participants have been 
arguing about over approximately the last five years!93 
 
      Nor had Fitzmaurice lost the verve that had allowed him to impose his 
view at the IIL without concealing his devotion to the principle of restrictive 
interpretation, when he concluded his dissenting opinion by saying: 
 
I have to conclude that - like it or not, so to speak - a right of access is 
not to be implied as being comprehended by Article 6.1 (art. 6-1) of 
the Convention, except by a process of interpretation that I do not 
regard as sound or as being in the best interests of international treaty 
law.94 (emphasis added) 
(b) The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine: Resurgence of In Dubio Mitius 
  
      The ECtHR has developed the doctrine of margin of appreciation to 
“avoid damaging confrontations between the Court and Contracting States 
over their respective spheres of authority and enables the Court to balance the 
sovereignty of Contracting Parties with their obligations under the 
Convention.”95 
      Put simply, the ECtHR has refused to interpret domestic law provisions in 
political and economical sensitive areas.96  Thus, in Handyside, examining the 
consistency of an English act (i.e., the Obscene Publications Act 1959, as 
amended by the Obscene Publications Act 1964), it expressly stated that “[by] 
reason of their direct and continuous contact with the vital forces of their 
countries, State authorities are in principle in a better position than the 
international judge to give an opinion on the exact content of these 
                                                          
93
 Id. at para. 39.  
94
 Id. at para. 48.  
95
 RONALD ST. JOHN MACDONALD, THE MARGIN OF APPRECIATION IN THE 
EUROPEAN SYSTEM OF HUMAN RIGHTS 123 (Martinus Nijhoff, 1993).  
96
 See James and Others v. United Kingdom, 98 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 46 (1986) 
(the Court finding it natural that “the margin of appreciation available to the 
legislature in implementing social and economic policies should be a wide one, will 
respect the legislature’s judgment as to what is ‘in the public interest’ unless that 
judgment be manifestly without reasonable foundation.”)  For comprehensive 
analyses of the margin of appreciation doctrine, see, e.g., HOWARD C. YOUROW, THE 
MARGIN OF APPRECIATION DOCTRINE IN THE DYNAMICS OF EUROPEAN HUMAN 
RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE (Martinus Nijhoff, 1996); and T. A. O'Donnell, The Margin 
of Appreciation Doctrine: Standards in the Jurisprudence of the European Court of 
Human Rights, 4 HUM. RTS. Q 474 (1982).  
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requirements . . . .”97 
      In this context, consider the following legal arguments made by the 
European Communities (EC) in EC – Hormones: (i) “It is submitted by the 
European Communities that WTO panels should adopt deferential 
"reasonableness" standard when reviewing a Member's decision to adopt a 
particular science policy or a Member's determination that a particular 
inference from the available data is scientifically plausible;”98 and (ii) “The 
European Communities considers that the principle of reasonable deference is 
applicable in all highly complex factual situations, including the assessment of 
the risks to human health arising from toxins and contaminants, and that 
therefore, the Panel applied an inappropriate standard of review in the present 
case.”99 
      Can one still maintain that they reflect the EC’s will to see the 
precautionary principle approach apply to the case or are the EC members 
countries merely using a successful jurisprudential tool (i.e., the margin of 
appreciation doctrine)?  In any case, the EC is far from being the only WTO 
Member used to applying such a doctrine.  Consider the following excerpt 
drawn from a decision of the U.S. Supreme Court reviewing a rule adopted by 
the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission to evaluate the environmental 
effects of a nuclear power plant’s fuel cycle: 
 
Third, a reviewing court must remember that the Commission is 
making predictions, within its area of special expertise, at the frontiers 
of science. When examining this kind of scientific determination, as 
opposed to simple findings of fact, a reviewing court must generally be 
at its most deferential. See, e.g., Industrial Union Dept. v. American 
Petroleum Institute, 448 U. S. 607, 656 (1980) (plurality opinion); id. 
at 448 U. S. 705-706 (Marshall, J., dissenting).100 
 
      Notwithstanding its relevance, the margin of appreciation doctrine, like 
the principle of in dubio mitius, reinforces nation states’ discretion and 
jeopardizes the very foundations of the international legal system.  This is 
especially concerning since this doctrine is used by other international courts, 
such as the ICJ101 or NAFTA tribunals.102  To this end, Eyal Benvenisti’s 
comments regarding the danger represented by the doctrine of margin of 
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 EC – Hormones, supra, n.____, at para. 14. 
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 See André Nollkaemper, The Role of Domestic Courts in the Case Law of the 
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appreciation, which is equally applicable to in dubio mitius, seems ineluctable:  
 
[T]he rhetoric of supporting national margin of appreciation and the 
lack of corresponding emphasis on universal values and standards may 
lead national institutions to resist external review altogether, claiming 
that they are the better judges of their particular domestic constraints 
and hence the final arbiters of their appropriate margin.103 
3. The Principle of In Dubio Mitius in Arbitral Awards 
 
     As McNair rightly noted, the principle of in dubio mitius “dates from an 
age in which treaties were interpreted not by legal tribunals, and not even 
much by lawyers, but by statesmen and diplomats.”104  Consequently, arbitral 
tribunals have constituted a place of predilection to raise such a principle.  
Thus, in Claims of the Nordstjernan Company, the arbitrator, Prof. Eugène 
Borel, concluded that: 
 
Considering the natural state of liberty and independence which is 
inherent in sovereign states, they are not to be presumed to have 
abandoned any part thereof, the consequence being that the high 
contracting Parties to a treaty are to be considered as bound only 
within the limits of what can clearly and unequivocally found in the 
provisions agreed to and that those provisions, in case of doubt, are to 
be interpreted in favor of the natural liberty and independence of the 
parties concerned.105  (emphasis added)  
 
      More significantly, the arbitral awards to which the AB referred in EC – 
Hormones unequivocally asserted the relevance of the principle of in dubio 
mitius.  Thus, in USA – France Air Transport Services Arbitration, the arbitral 
tribunal believed that “of two possible interpretations, the choice of that 
involves less extensive obligations for the obligated Party seems to be 
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especially justified.”106  Similarly, in De Pascale Claim, the Italian-United 
States Conciliation Commission held: 
 
[T]he construction preferred by the Commission . . . is controlling 
because of the fact that is the most literal of the three interpretations 
analysed and is the most restrictive upon the provision in question.  
The international legal system is in favor of the freedom of the 
subjects involved.  The principle of interpretation that preserves this 
freedom harmonizes with prevailing the tendency of international 
intercourse, a fact which also flows, among other things, from the 
jurisprudence of the Permanent Court of International Justice (for 
instance Series A, No. 10, p. 18 [i.e., the Lotus Case]).107 
 
     However, the depiction of the arbitral tribunals’ position towards the 
principle of in dubio mitius is not as homogeneous as the AB suggests, for 
some arbitral tribunals have been skeptical about the weight to give to in 
dubio mitius.108  Consider Lauterpacht’s observation, according to which: 
 
What value – except a negative value as an element of confusion – can 
be attached to a rule of interpretation which, in the language of a 
carefully worded arbitral award, is to be resorted to only ‘in the case of 
absolute impossibility of ascertaining the exact meaning’ of a 
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a case for application of the clause in article 2 (e) of Annex I A of the 1953 
Agreement on German External Debts [hereinafter German External Debts], 19 R. 
INT'L ARB. AWARDS 67, 137 (1980) (reiterating that “the Court [PCIJ] observed that 
notwithstanding the validity of the principle, according to which conventions 
involving the abandonment of certain rights inherent in sovereignty must be 
interpreted restrictively, one must in every case resolve issues in terms of what a 
treaty actually meant.”) 
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treaty?109 
4. The Principle of In Dubio Mitius before Domestic Tribunals 
 
      Although the Report of the Study Group of the International Law 
Commission on Fragmentation of International Law characterized in dubio 
mitius as a legal process principle drawn from domestic laws,110 actual 
mention of this principle in domestic legal orders is extremely rare.  In the 
period prior to the report of the AB in EC – Hormones, this principle was 
mentioned once in a hearing before the Civil Division of the Court of Appeal 
in the UK in 1996 regarding the application of maxims of interpretation to the 
construction of a postponement letter.  In this case, the judge found that: 
 
Swiss principles of construction applicable to private documents have 
a close similarity to English principles, both in their general tendency 
and (to some extent) in particular maxims. The purpose is to discover 
the real intention of the parties. The language in which they express 
their agreement is the starting-point in the search for their intention, 
but the search is not restricted to their language, and the letter is not to 
prevail over the spirit. Evidence of the surrounding circumstances, 
including the business context of the agreement, is admissible. 
Evidence of the parties' subsequent conduct is also admissible as an 
aid to the construction of a contract. There are various maxims of 
construction which may be resorted to in case of doubt, including "in 
dubio mitius" - that is, in case of doubt a provision should be 
interpreted in the sense most favourable to the party who commits 
himself; this is only one of many maxims that may apply in case of 
doubt.111 
 
      However, some domestic canons of interpretation startlingly close to the 
concept of in dubio mitius have been used before domestic courts.  Consider, 
for instance, the use of the “special Indian-related interpretative canon,”112 
according to which “statutes are to be construed liberally in favor of the 
Indians, with ambiguous provisions interpreted to their benefit,”113 in the 
                                                          
109
 Lauterpacht, supra, n.____, at 63.  
110
 See Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission: 
Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and 
Expansion of International Law, U.N. GAOR, 58th Sess., at 254, U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.4/L.682 (2006). 
111
 Banque Banque Financière de la Cité v Parc (Battersea) Ltd Omnicorp 
Overseas Ltd [1996] EWCA Civ 1065. 
112
 Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 534 U.S. 84, 88 (2001). 
113
 Id.  
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jurisprudence of the U.S. Supreme Court.114  In Chickasaw Nation, the Court 
did not find this canon of interpretation conclusive,115 arguing that: 
 
For one thing, canons are not mandatory rules.  They are guides that 
“need not be conclusive.” Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U. S. 
105, 115 (2001).  They are designed to help judges determine the 
Legislature’s intent as embodied in particular statutory language.  And 
other circumstances evidencing congressional intent can overcome 
their force.  In this instance, to accept as conclusive the canons on 
which the Tribes rely would produce an interpretation that we 
conclude would conflict with the intent embodied in the statute 
Congress wrote.116 
 
      As it is also the case for the principle of in dubio mitius with respect to the 
principle of effectiveness,117 the Court noted that canons of interpretations 
“are often countered . . . by some maxim pointing in a different direction”118 
and “do not determine how to read this statute.”119 
      Conversely, Justice O’Connor reached a different conclusion, emphasizing 
that “[f]aced with the unhappy choice of determining which part of a flawed 
statutory section is in error, I would thus rely upon the long-established Indian 
canon of construction and adopt the reading most favorable to the Nations.”120 
B. The Post-Hormones Legal Landscape 
 
     If several WTO Members have raised in dubio mitius as a defense, it is the 
AB alone who made this situation possible by elevating this principle to the 
rank of “interpretative principle . . . widely recognized in international law as 
a ‘supplementary means of interpretation.’”121 (emphasis added)  The motives 
underlying this decision are likely to be found in the AB’s early attempt to 
answer the criticisms voiced against the WTO’s dispute settlement system’s 
threat to national sovereignty, as William Davey noted: 
 
Since its inception in 1995, the World Trade Organization’s dispute 
settlement system has attracted a great deal of attention – from WTO 
                                                          
114
 See, e.g., Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 392 (1976) (quoting Alaska 
Pacific Fisheries v. United States, 248 U.S. 78, 89 (1918); and Shoshone Indians v. 
United States, 324 U.S. 335 (1945). 
115
 Chickasaw Nation v. United States, supra, n.____, at 95 (concluding: “[T]he 
canons here cannot make the difference for which the Tribes argue.”). 
116
 Id.   
117
 See Annuaire de l’Institut de Droit International, supra, n.____, at 372, 412.  
118
 Chickasaw Nation v. United States, supra, n.____, at 85.   
119
 Id.  
120
 Id. at 102 (Justice O’Connor, dissenting). 
121
 EC – Hormones, supra, n.____. 
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Members, who have made extensive use of it and who have frequently 
insisted that it rule on quite difficult and controversial disputes – to the 
public at large, who may know little details about its operation or 
decisions, but who have (or are told by various sources that they 
should have) serious concerns about its threat to national sovereignty 
or their preferred environmental policies.  Among academics – both 
legal and economic – who have followed the evolution of the GATT 
into the WTO, there is sometimes concern expressed that some 
controversial decisions emanating from the WTO dispute settlement 
mechanism may undermine popular, and ultimately governmental, 
support for the multilateral trading system to the detriment of world at 
large.122 
 
      Under the pressure of some or all of these criticisms – towards which 
Davey barely hid his frustration – the AB made the mistake in EC – 
Hormones of entitling WTO Members to invoke the principle of in dubio 
mitius, which has lead to an ambiguous result regarding both the future and 
status of this principle in the WTO case law and beyond.  
1. WTO Case Law  
 
     Implicit or explicit reference to the principle of in dubio mitius was made 
in: 4 AB reports;123 10 panel reports;124 and 4 government submissions.125  It 
                                                          
122
 William Davey, Has the WTO Dispute Settlement System Exceeded its 
Authority? A Consideration of Deference Shown by the System to Member 
Government Decisions and Its Use of Issue-Avoidance Techniques, 4(1) J. INT. ECON. 
LAW 79 (2001).  
123
 See Appellate Body Report, Korea – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages (Korea – 
Alcohol), WT/DS75/AB/R, WT/DS84/AB/R, adopted 18 January 1999, paras 5, 12, 
47, 78; EC – Hormones, supra, n.____; Appellate Body Report, Chile – Price Band 
System and Safeguard Measures Relating to Certain Agriculture Products (Chile – 
Price Band), WT/DS207/AB/R, adopted 23 September 2002, para. 110; and 
Appellate Body Report, United States – Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of 
Circular Welded Carbon Quality Line Pipe from Korea (U.S. – Line Pipe 
Safeguards), WT/DS202/AB/R, adopted 15 February 2002, para. 20. 
124
 See Panel Report, China – Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement 
of Intellectual Property Rights (China – IP Rights), WT/DS362/R, adopted 26 
January 2009, paras 4.797-798; Panel Report, Chile – Price Band System and 
Safeguard Measures Relating to Certain Agriculture Products (Chile – Price Band), 
WT/DS207/R, adopted 3 May 2002, paras 4.45-4.46; Panel Report, United States – 
Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974 (U.S. – Section 301), WT/DS152/R, 
adopted 22 December 1999, paras 4.388-4.389, 4.470; Panel Report, United States – 
Anti-Dumping Act of 1916 (U.S. – 1916 Act) (Complaint by Japan), WT/DS162/R, 
adopted 29 May 2000, paras 3.89-3.90; Panel Report, United States – Anti-Dumping 
Act of 1916 (U.S. – 1916 Act) (Complaint by the European Communities), 
WT/DS136/R, adopted 31 March 2000, para. 6.87; Panel Report, Argentina – 
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is noteworthy that WTO Members – and not WTO panels or the AB – raised 
most of these references (i.e., 10 out of 14 WTO panels’ and AB’s reports).  
(a) EC – Hormones: The AB’s Self-Limitation of Its Exercise of Judicial          
    Interpretation 
 
      While interpreting the Panel’s interpretation of Article 3.1 of the SPS 
Agreement, the AB in EC – Hormones found that “[w]e cannot lightly assume 
that sovereign states intended to impose upon themselves the more onerous, 
rather than the less burdensome, obligation by mandating conformity or 
compliance with such standards, guidelines and recommendations.”126 
      The AB justified its finding by giving a doctrinal definition of in dubio 
mitius,127 which it supported by a series of jurisprudential and doctrinal 
references supposedly confirming the relevance of this treaty interpretation 
principle in international law.128 
                                                                                                                                                 
Safeguard Measures on Imports of Footwear (Argentina – Footwear Safeguard), 
adopted WT/DS121/R 25 June 1999, para. 7.8; Panel Report, United States – 
Measures on Imports of Fresh, Chilled or Frozen Lamb Meat from New Zealand and 
Australia (U.S. – Lamb Safeguard), WT/DS177/R, WT/DS178/R, adopted 21 
December 2000, para. 7.16; Panel Reports, European Communities – Export 
subsidies on Sugar (EC – Sugar Subsidies), WT/DS283/R (Complaint by Thailand), 
WT/DS266/R (Complaint by Brazil), WT/DS265/R (Complaint by Australia), 
adopted 15 October 2004, para. 4.208; and Panel Report, Canada – Measures 
Affecting the Importation of Milk and the Exportation of Dairy Products (Canada – 
Milk/Dairy), WT/DS103/R, WT/DS113/R, adopted 17 May 1999, para. 4.491. 
125
 See China – IP Rights, supra, n.____, China's rebuttal submission, at paras 51-
56; Panel Report, United States – Subsidies on Upland Cotton (U.S. – Cotton 
Subsidies), WT/DS267/R, adopted 8 September 2004, Annex A-3: Argentina’s Third 
Party Initial Brief, WT/DS267/R/Add.1, 10 June 2003, at A-15, para. 6, Annex B-3: 
Third Party Submission by Argentina, WT/DS267/R/Add.1, 15 July 2003, at B-25, 
para. 41; Oral Statement by the European Communities at the Second Substantive 
meeting with the parties, European Communities – Export subsidies on Sugar (EC – 
Sugar Subsidies), DS 265, 266, 283, 11 May 2004, at 25, para. 84; and Appellant 
Submission of the United States, United States – Definitive Safeguard Measures on 
Imports of Circular Welded Carbon Quality Line Pipe from Korea (U.S. – Line Pipe 
Safeguards), 20 November 2001, paras 48-49. 
126
 EC – Hormones, supra, n.____, at para. 165. 
127
 See supra 2. First Attempts to Use In Dubio Mitius to Interpret Ambiguous 
Treaty Provisions, at ___ and accompanying notes. 
128
 See R. JENNINGS & A. WATTS ET AL., OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 
1278 (9th ed, vol. I, Longman, 1992); BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 631 (4th ed., Clarendon Press, 1990); C. ROUSSEAU, DROIT 
INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 273 (vol. I. 1990); D. CARREAU, DROIT INTERNATIONAL 142 
(4th ed., Editions A. Pedone, 1994); M. DÍEZ DE VELASCO, INSTITUCIONES DE 
DERECHO INTERNACIONAL PÚBLICO 163-164 (9th ed, vol. I, Editorial Tecnos, 1991); 
B. CONFORTI, DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE 99-100 (3rd ed., Editoriale Scientifica, 
1987); Nuclear Tests Case (Australia v. France), supra, n.____, at 267; Access to, or 
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(b) The Use of In Dubio Mitius in WTO Case Law  
 
      Never before footnote 154 of EC – Hormones had a GATT/WTO panel or 
the AB referred to the actual words in dubio mitius.  After this report, WTO 
Members saw in this principle of in dubio mitius an opportunity to curtail the 
AB’s exercise of judicial interpretation.  Therefore, the EC invoked this 
principle in: 
 
 (i) Chile – Price Band, where it considered that the Panel “lightly assumed 
that WTO Members had taken on a more onerous obligation than that 
apparent from the text, contrary to the in dubio mitius principle referred to by 
the Appellate Body in EC – Hormones;”129 
 
 (ii) EC – Sugar Subsidies, where it “regarded the principle of in dubio 
mitius as more appropriate, since it applied to treaties, had been recognized by 
the Appellate Body, and required that an interpretation be preferred which 
impinged as little as possible on the sovereignty of Members.”130  Prior to this 
report, the EC made an oral statement at the Second Substantive meeting with 
the parties in which it argued that “the principle of in dubio mitius is more 
appropriate. This principle applies to treaties, has been recognised by the 
Appellate Body and requires that an interpretation be preferred which 
impinges as little as possible on the sovereignty of Members;”131 and 
 
 (iii) EC – Sardines,132 where the EC, without citing expressly the AB’s 
report in EC – Hormones, quoted in extenso the AB’s finding in EC – 
Hormones that had compelled the AB to justify itself in footnote 154 and 
according to which: “We cannot lightly assume that sovereign states intended 
to impose upon themselves the more onerous, rather than the less burdensome, 
obligation by mandating conformity or compliance with such standards, 
guidelines and recommendations.”133 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
Anchorage in, the Port of Danzig, of Polish War Vessels, 1931 P.C.I.J. (ser. A./B.) 
No. 43, at 142 (Dec. 11); Air Transport Services Agreement Arbitration (United 
States v. France) (1963), supra, n.____, at 243; and De Pascale Claim (Italian-
United States Conciliation Commission) (1961), supra, n.____, at 250.  
129
 Chile – Price Band (AB), supra, n.____. 
130
 Panel Reports, European Communities – Export subsidies on Sugar (EC – 
Sugar Subsidies), WT/DS283/R (Complaint by Thailand), WT/DS266/R (Complaint 
by Brazil), WT/DS265/R (Complaint by Australia), adopted 15 October 2004, para. 
4.208. 
131
 EC – Sugar Subsidies (Oral Statement by the European Communities), supra, 
n.____. 
132
 Panel Report, European Communities – Trade Description of Sardines (EC – 
Sardines), WT/DS231/R, adopted 29 May 2002, para. 7.82.  
133
 EC – Hormones, supra, n.____.  
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     The U.S. tied the EC’s record by raising the principle of in dubio mitius in: 
 
 (i) U.S. – Line Pipe Safeguards, where the U.S. considered that “the Panel 
disregarded the principle ‘in dubio mitius’, an accepted principle of treaty 
interpretation, and infringed unnecessarily on the manner in which the United 
States has internally structured the decision-making process of its competent 
authority.”134  In this report, the Appellant Submission of the United States 
stated: “The principle of in dubio mitius supports an interpretation of treaty 
language that assumes that sovereign states intend to impose upon themselves 
less burdensome, as opposed to more onerous, obligations absent any 
agreement language to the contrary. The Appellate Body has recognized the 
relevance of this principle of treaty interpretation . . . .”135 
 
 (ii) U.S. – Section 301, where the U.S. argued that the “EC's proposed 
construction of Article XVI:4, even if it had so much as an ambiguous textual 
basis, would run afoul of the in dubio mitius principle,”136 which “is 
applicable in WTO disputes as a supplementary means of interpretation;”137 
and 
 
 (iii) U.S. – 1916 Act, where the U.S. concluded that “the Panel should be 
guided by the interpretative principle of in dubio mitius.”138 
 
       And the Chinese government does not intend to let its European and 
American counterparts monopolize in dubio mitius, as it is the latest WTO 
Member to have raised this principle, albeit unsuccessfully, in China – IP 
Rights; a dispute brought by the United States against China for not providing 
for criminal procedures and penalties to be applied in cases of wilful 
trademark counterfeiting or copyright piracy on a commercial scale that fail to 
meet certain thresholds.139   
 
 The other WTO Members who have invoked the principle of in dubio 
mitius are: 
 
                                                          
134
 U.S. – Line Pipe Safeguards (AB), supra, n.____.  
135
 U.S. – Line Pipe Safeguards (Appellant Submission of the United States), 
supra, n.____, at para. 48. 
136
 U.S. – Section 301 (Panel Report), supra, n.____, at para. 4.389.  
137
 Id. at para. 4.388.  
138
 Panel Report, United States – Anti-Dumping Act of 1916 (U.S. – 1916 Act) 
(Complaint by Japan), WT/DS162/R, adopted 29 May 2000, para.  3.89.  
139
 See China – IP Rights, supra, n.____, at para. 7.497 (China arguing “for the 
application of the ‘interpretative canon’ of in dubio mitius which, it submits, has a 
particular justification in the realm of criminal law;” an area where China considers 
“that the Panel should treat sovereign jurisdiction over police powers as a powerful 
default norm, departure from which can be authorized only in light of explicit and 
unequivocal consent of State parties.”) 
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 (i) Korea, in Korea – Alcohol, emphasizing that “[g]iven that ambiguity, 
Article 19.2 of the DSU and the principles of predictability and in dubio 
mitius should have been respected by the Panel;”140 
 
 (ii) Chile, in Chile – Price Band, stating: 
 
[I]n the event that the Panel had any doubts over the correct 
interpretation of Article 4.2, the legal principle in dubio mitius, which 
the Appellate Body has endorsed, would suggest that vagueness and 
ambiguity should not be resolved against Chile, but rather against the 
complaining party that seeks to invalidate Chile's long standing 
system;141  
 
 (iii) Canada, in Canada – Milk/Dairy, noting “that the legal principle of in 
dubio mitius, may also apply with respect to the interpretation of the terms and 
conditions in Canada’s Schedule regarding fluid milk;”142 and 
 
  (iv) Argentina, in its Third Party Initial Brief in U.S. – Cotton Subsidies, 
arguing that: 
 
A different interpretation would imply giving the measures allegedly 
covered by the Peace Clause a character of absolute immunity, 
independent of whether the legal requirements established in Article 
13 are fulfilled or not. This would contradict the principle of in dubio 
mitius, constituting a more onerous interpretation of the treaty 
provisions.143 
 
      In the three remaining instances, WTO panels made explicit references to 
the AB’s finding in EC – Hormones in: 
 
 (i) U.S. – 1916 Act, where the Panel found that “[s]ince the United States 
had so far applied its law in conformity with Article VIII of the GATT 1947 
and since there was no evidence that the United States intended to apply the 
law in a GATT-incompatible manner, the principle in dubio mitius logically 
applied;”144 
 
 (ii) Argentina – Footwear Safeguard, where the Panel stated: 
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 Appellate Body Report, Korea – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages (Korea – 
Alcohol), WT/DS75/AB/R, WT/DS84/AB/R, adopted 18 January 1999, para. 5.  
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 Chile – Price Band (Panel Report), supra, n.____, at para. 4.45.  
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While we do recognise the general interpretative principle "in dubio 
mitius" raised by Argentina, we do not share Argentina's apparent 
opinion that under the Safeguards Agreement it is for the national 
authority to choose one of several possible factual or legal 
interpretations.  Rather, regarding legal interpretations, a treaty must 
be interpreted, pursuant to Article 31 of the Vienna Convention, in 
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the 
treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose;145 and 
 
 (iii) U.S. – Lamb Safeguard, where the Panel noted in the cases’ context 
“the Appellate Body's statement that ‘[t]he principle of in dubio mitius applies 
in interpreting treaties, in deference to the sovereignty of states.’”146 
(c) The Flaw of Footnote 154 
 
      First, the references selected by the AB in EC – Hormones and their use is 
questionable.  Thus, the AB’s definition of the principle in dubio mitius in 
footnote 154 is incomplete, for Robert Jennings and Arthur Watts added 
where the AB left off: 
 
However, in applying this principle [i.e., in dubio mitius] regard must 
be had to the fact that the assumption of obligations constitutes the 
primary purpose of the treaty, and that, in general, the parties must be 
presumed to have intended the treaty to be effective (see (9) below).  
Further, it usual for courts to interpret strictly exceptions to a principal 
provision imposing obligations on a state, notwithstanding that the 
principle in dubio mitius might suggest that the exception be given a 
liberal interpretation.147 
 
     The editing choice of the AB is significant, as Oppenheim’s entire 
definition of in dubio mitius underscores the weight of the effectiveness 
principle (i.e., effet utile); an interpretation principle which has always played 
an important role in the jurisprudence of the WTO.148  To this end, Dominique 
                                                          
145
 Argentina – Footwear Safeguard (Panel Report), supra, n.____, at para. 7.8.  
146
 U.S. – Lamb Safeguard (Panel Report), supra, n.____, at para. 7.16. 
147
 JENNINGS & WATTS, supra, n.____, at 1278.  
148
 See, e.g., Panel Report, United States – Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations 
Act of 1998 (U.S. – Section 211), WT/DS176/R, adopted 6 August 2001, para. 8.79 
(footnote 122 reading: “The principle of effective interpretation or "l'effet utile" or in 
latin ut res magis valeat quam pereat reflects the general rule of interpretation which 
requires that a treaty be interpreted to give meaning and effect to all the terms of the 
treaty.”); US — Gasoline (AB), WT/DS2/AB/R, supra, n.____, at 23 (concluding 
that “[a]n interpreter is not free to adopt a reading that would result in reducing 
whole clauses or paragraphs of a treaty to redundancy or inutility.”); Appellate Body 
Report, Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages (Japan—Alcoholic Beverages), 
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Carreau, who was also cited in footnote 154,149 noted the difficulty to 
reconcile in dubio mitius with the approach to treaty interpretation based upon 
the object and purpose of a treaty,150 which explains the hostility of state 
sovereignty defenders towards the teleological approach to treaty 
interpretation.”151  Furthermore, Jennings and Watts illustrated the limits of in 
dubio mitius by taking the example of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) 
who “in a number of judgments refrained from interpreting the treaties 
establishing the EC in such a way as to interfere as little possible with the 
rights of the member states.”152 
      Similarly, the AB selected two arbitral awards demonstrating the 
relevance of in dubio mitius.153  However, we showed earlier that the arbitral 
tribunals’ position towards the principle of in dubio mitius was not as 
homogeneous as the AB suggested given that some arbitral tribunals having 
been skeptical about the weight to give to this principle.154  
      Second, the structure itself of footnote 154 undermines the finding of the 
AB in EC – Hormones, for Gráinne de Búrca and Joanne Scott emphasized 
the weakness of some AB’s reports’ footnotes containing references to cases 
before the ICJ and specific quotation from an academic work.155  Examining 
footnote 156 of the AB’s report in U.S. – Shrimp recognizing the doctrine of 
                                                                                                                                                 
WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R, WT/DS11/AB/R, adopted 4 October 1996, at 12 
(emphasizing that “[a] fundamental tenet of treaty interpretation flowing from the 
general rule of interpretation set out in Article 31 [VCLT] is the principle of 
effectiveness.”); and Panel Report, Korea — Definitive Safeguard Measure on 
Imports of Certain Dairy Products ("Korea — Dairy Safeguards"), WT/DS98/R, 
adopted 21 June 1999, para. 7.37 (recalling “the principle of ‘effective interpretation’ 
whereby all terms must be given their full meaning and must be interpreted with each 
other to avoid inconsistencies or ‘inutility.’”)  For a discussion of the effectiveness 
principle see Document A/6309/Rev.l: Reports of the International Law Commission 
on the second part of its seventeenth session and on its eighteenth session, 2 YB 
INT'L L. COMM'N 1, 219 (1966), U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1966/Add.1; JENNINGS & 
WATTS, supra, n.____, at 1280-1281; Corfu Channel Case (United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland v. Albania), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 24 (Apr. 9) (stating that 
“[i]t would indeed be incompatible with the generally accepted rules of interpretation 
to admit that a provision of this sort occurring in a special agreement should be 
devoid of purport or effect.”); and Case Concerning the Territorial Dispute Case 
(Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. Chad), 1994 I.C.J. 6, 23 (Feb. 3). 
149
 See EC – Hormones, supra, n.____.  
150
 See CARREAU, supra, n.____, at 143 (translated from French). 
151
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 JENNINGS & WATTS, supra, n.____.  
153
 Air Transport Services Agreement Arbitration (United States v. France) 
(1963), supra, n.____; and De Pascale Claim (Italian-United States Conciliation 
Commission) (1961), supra, n.____.  
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 See Allemagne contre Commissaire aux revenues gagés, supra, n.____; and 
German External Debts, supra, n.____. 
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 See GRÁINNE DE BÚRCA & JOANNE SCOTT, THE EU AND THE WTO: LEGAL 
AND CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 21 (Hart Publishing, 2001).  
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abus de droit,156 whose content mirrors footnote 154 used by the AB in EC – 
Hormones a few months earlier, de Búrca and Scott drew the conclusion that 
the AB was articulating a range of standards “almost from nowhere.”157  I do 
not contend that either footnotes of the WTO case law are worthless, or that 
de Búrca and Scott assumed that all footnotes are used by the AB to abuse its 
authority, as some WTO panels successfully used footnotes to acknowledge 
the relevance of specific treaty interpretations such the effet utile principle or 
ut res magis valeat quam pereat.158  I contend, however, that footnotes that are 
manipulated by the AB, as was the case in EC – Hormones, to reflect a partial 
view of international tribunals’ jurisprudence or the doctrine, jeopardize the 
future of international law.  At the very least, they do not and cannot entitle 
the AB to proclaim the principle of in dubio mitius as “widely recognized in 
international law as a ‘supplementary means of interpretation.’”159  (emphasis 
added) 
(d) Unsolved Questions  
 
     The ambivalence of WTO panels and the AB towards treaty interpretation 
principles, especially the principle of in dubio mitius, has contributed to 
harming the legitimacy of the WTO dispute settlement system.  On the one 
hand, the Panel in U.S. – Section 211 characterized the principle of effective 
interpretation or effet utile as a “general rule of interpretation which requires 
that a treaty be interpreted to give meaning and effect to all the terms of the 
treaty.”160  On the other hand, the AB in U.S. – Shrimp defined another treaty 
interpretation (i.e., the doctrine of abus de droit or abuse of right) as a 
“general principle of law and a general principle of international law [that] 
                                                          
156
 See Appellate Body Report, United States – Import Prohibition of Certain 
Shrimp and Shrimp Products (U.S. – Shrimp), WT/DS58/AB/R, adopted 12 October 
1998, para. 158, n. 156.  In this footnote, the AB recognized the doctrine of abus de 
droit by stating in part:  
A reasonable and bona fide exercise of a right in such a case is one which is 
appropriate and necessary for the purpose of the right (i.e., in furtherance of the 
interests which the right is intended to protect).  It should at the same time be 
fair and equitable as between the parties and not one which is calculated to 
procure for one of them an unfair advantage in the light of the obligation 
assumed.  A reasonable exercise of the right is regarded as compatible with the 
obligation.  But the exercise of the right in such a manner as to prejudice the 
interests of the other contracting party arising out of the treaty is unreasonable 
and is considered as inconsistent with the bona fide execution of the treaty 
obligation, and a breach of the treaty. 
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controls the exercise of rights by states.”161  In this context, the AB in EC – 
Hormones considered in dubio mitius “an interpretative principle . . . widely 
recognized in international law.”162  Therefore, are a general principle of law 
and a general principle of international law the same principle?  Is a general 
rule of interpretation different than an interpretative principle widely 
recognized in international law?  In other words, have WTO panels and the 
AB established a hierarchy of treaty interpretation principles?  If so, is an 
interpretative principle widely recognized in international law, such as in 
dubio mitius, at the top or bottom of this hierarchy?  To complicate the 
situation, the Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission 
on Fragmentation of International Law stated: 
 
‘General international law’ clearly refers to general customary law as 
well as ‘general principles of law recognized by civilized nations’ 
under article 38 (1) (c) of the Statute of the International Court of 
Justice.  But it might also refer to principles of international law proper 
and to analogies from domestic laws, especially principles of the legal 
process (audiatur et altera pars, in dubio mitius, estoppel and so on).  
In the practice of international tribunals, including the Appellate Body 
of the WTO or the European and Inter-American Courts of Human 
Rights reference is constantly made to various kinds of ‘principles’ 
sometimes drawn from domestic law, sometimes from international 
practice but often in a way that leaves their authority unspecified.163 
(emphasis added) 
 
      Furthermore, the reticence of the AB in EC – Hormones to interfere with a 
WTO Member’s sovereignty could be interpreted as a form of judicial 
economy or, as in Davey’s terms, an “issue-avoidance” technique.164  Indeed, 
how the decision of the AB to defer to the WTO Member’s interpretation of a 
treaty provision differ from the technique that has been developed by courts 
over time to dispose of cases where a decision seems inappropriate for judicial 
consideration (e.g., political questions; non liquet) or simply too 
controversial?165  Contrary to Thomas Cottier’s view, it seems that the Lotus 
rationale and the distinction between political and legal disputes has yet to be 
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overcome.166 
2. The Application of In Dubio Mitius in the Settlement of Investment Disputes 
 
      Today, the AB’s finding in EC – Hormones has spread to other areas of 
international law.  Thus, one form of the principle of in dubio mitius, in dubio 
pars mitior est sequenda (i.e., when in doubt, the milder course is to be 
followed) is often used in the area of international investment law.  In SGS 
Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Pakistan, the International Centre for 
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) concluded: 
 
We believe, for the foregoing considerations, that Article 11 of the 
BIT would have to be considerably more specifically worded before it 
can reasonably be read in the extraordinarily expansive manner 
submitted by the Claimant. The appropriate interpretive approach is 
the prudential one summed up in the literature as in dubio pars mitior 
est sequenda, or more tersely, in dubio mitius.167 
 
     Similarly, in El Paso v. Argentina, the ICSID noted that “[i]n effect, 
although not by name, the Tribunal relied on the in dubio mitius canon 
rejected by the Eurekoand Aguas del Tunari tribunals.”168 
3. The Traditional Venues of In Dubio Mitius  
(a) In Dubio Mitius before Domestic Tribunals: Marchiori  
 
      Here, the article will take the example of a recent decision rendered by the 
Civil Division of the Court of Appeal in the UK to illustrate the lasting 
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relevance of in dubio mitius before domestic tribunals.  In Marchiori,169 while 
confronting the application of the Treaty establishing the European Atomic 
Energy Community (Euratom) and Directive 85/337 to their domestic 
legislation, the judge of the Court of Appeal’s panel in charge of examining 
this question of treaty interpretation, Laws LJ, found that “the principle of 
Treaty interpretation summarised in the Latin phrase in dubio mitius: where a 
Treaty provision is ambiguous, the interpretation which is less onerous to the 
State owing the Treaty obligation is to be preferred” applied to this case.170 
      Previously, the Queen's Bench Division of the Administrative Court had 
also found that “[t]here must be an inherent presumption against any 
sovereign State ceding to other States control of or access to military activities 
and in case of doubt, the decision should be resolved by application of the 
principle in dubio mitius.”171  During the hearing, the judge on the 
Administrative Court’s panel, Turner J, acknowledged the principle of 
restrictive interpretation: 
 
[T]here is a proposition of international law which conditions the 
proper approach to the interpretation of any treaty. The principle in 
play is that which regards the maintenance of independent sovereignty 
as a feature which is not to be removed unless the purpose and effect 
of a treaty demonstrate that such was the treaty intention.172 
 
     The Administrative Court went on to justify its position, as the AB did in 
EC – Hormones, by citing Oppenhein: “[i]f the meaning of a term is 
ambiguous, that meaning is to be preferred which is less onerous to the party 
assuming the obligation, or which interferes less with the territorial and 
personal supremacy of the party, or involves less general restrictions upon the 
parties.”173 
(b) In Dubio Mitius Before International Arbitral Tribunals: The Iron Rhine 
 Case 
 
      In this case, the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) had to determine 
whether “Article XII of the Separation Treaty [at issue] should, in so far as it 
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contains a restriction to the territorial sovereignty of the Netherlands, in 
accordance with international law, be construed restrictively.”174  
      The process that led the Court to the conclusion that the treaty at issue 
must be interpreted using the normal rules of interpretation identified in 
Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention principle to the detriment of the 
restrictive interpretation principle is noteworthy.175  Thus, the Court first noted 
that: 
 
It is true that in both the Free Zones case and in Case of the S.S. 
Wimbledon (P.C.I.J. Series A, No. 1 (1923) at p. 24) the Permanent 
Court said that in case of doubt about a limitation on sovereignty that 
limitation is to be interpreted restrictively. In the latter case, the 
Permanent Court did caution, however, that it would nonetheless ‘feel 
obliged to stop at the point where the so-called restrictive 
interpretation would be contrary to the plain terms of the article and 
would destroy what has been clearly granted.’176  
 
      Then, the PCA discarded the restrictive interpretation principle (i.e., in 
dubio mitius) by stating: 
 
The doctrine of restrictive interpretation never had a hierarchical 
supremacy, but was a technique to ensure a proper balance of the 
distribution of rights within a treaty system.  The principle of 
restrictive interpretation, whereby treaties are to be interpreted in 
favour of state sovereignty in case of doubt, is not in fact mentioned in 
the provisions of the Vienna Convention. The object and purpose of a 
treaty, taken together with the intentions of the parties, are the 
prevailing elements for interpretation. Indeed, it has also been noted in 
the literature that a too rigorous application of the principle of 
restrictive interpretation might be inconsistent with the primary 
purpose of the treaty (see Jennings and Watts, Oppenheim’s 
International Law, 9th Edition (1992), at p. 1279). Restrictive 
interpretation thus has particularly little role to play in certain 
categories of treaties – such as, for example, human rights treaties. 
Indeed, some authors note that the principle has not been relied upon 
in any recent jurisprudence of international courts and tribunals and 
that its contemporary relevance is to be doubted (Bernhardt “Evolutive 
Treaty Interpretation, Especially of the European Convention on 
Human Rights,” 42 German Yearbook of International Law (1999), p. 
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11, at p. 14).177  
IV. Division of the Legal Doctrine on the Principle of In Dubio Mitius  
 
     Treaty interpretation principles, in particular in dubio mitius, are but a tool 
in the ongoing ideological debate dividing the legal doctrine over the 
conception of what the relationship between domestic and international law 
should be.  More importantly, this debate betrays the divergences of views 
regarding the extent to which an international court – such as the AB in EC – 
Hormones – should defer to national sovereignty.  As Lauterpacht rightly 
noted: 
 
[T]he main reason why the rule of restrictive interpretation has 
acquired prominence in international law is not that it has been 
considered by many to represent a general principle of law.  The main 
explanation of the prominence of the rule of restrictive interpretation 
in the international sphere is that it has been resorted to by reference to 
and on account of the sovereignty of independent states.  It is not only 
that in case of doubt the contractual obligation must be interpreted in 
favor of the debtor; it is because states are sovereign that a restrictive 
interpretation must be put upon their obligations.178 (emphasis added) 
 
     Therefore, this article demonstrates (a) how a part of the legal doctrine has 
denounced the inadequacy of in dubio mitius in international law, and (b) why 
the AB and other international courts have strived to use this principle to 
mistakenly preserve their credibility.  Finally, it underlines the arguments 
raised by some legal scholars to persist in applying in dubio mitius to certain 
specific legal areas.  
A. The Inadequacy of In Dubio Mitius in International Law 
 
     From Lauterpacht to John Jackson, several prominent legal scholars have 
challenged the use of in dubio mitius in international law by exposing its 
inherent flaws and opposing it to other canons of interpretation. 
1. The Inherent Flaws of In Dubio Mitius 
(a) A Diplomatic Concept 
 
 Michael Lennard argued that in dubio mitius is not a legal principle, but a 
diplomatic concept inherited from what McNair described as “an age in which 
treaties were interpreted not by legal tribunals, and not even much by lawyers 
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but by statesmen and diplomats.”179  As a result, he drew the conclusion that 
“[i]t might seem surprising that as the WTO becomes a more legally 
orientated institution, the Appellate Body should be placing faith in a maxim 
that seems to have been little relied on by other modern legal tribunals.”180   
      While Lennard’s observation is correct, note that the principle of in dubio 
mitius is not the only defective concept from the past that has been carried into 
the WTO.  To this end, I have argued elsewhere that non-violation complaints 
of Article XXIII:1(b) of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT)181 have remained “for better or worse a keystone element of the 
WTO dispute settlement system.”182 
      The similarity between in dubio mitius and non-violation complaints is 
striking.  As in the case of in dubio mitius, I found that (i) non-violations were 
considered “a diplomat’s legal concept of legal order,”183 (ii) Uruguay Round 
negotiators had been unable to agree on a definition of “non-violation,”184 (iii) 
there have been only a handful of non-violation cases,185 and (vi) both WTO 
panels and the AB had failed to define the concept of non-violation.186   
(b) An Absurd Concept 
 
      Elaborating on the modern application of in dubio mitius, Jackson warned: 
 
There is even a doctrine that has been evoked in one case  [i.e., EC – 
Hormones] and attempted as part of advocacy in several other cases in 
the WTO, which absurdly states that if there is any ambiguity, the 
acting nation state’s actions should be deemed not consistent with the 
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agreement.  The doctrine is called in dubio mitius and it is largely 
discredited.187 
 
      McNair, who found that, also took this position: 
 
It is difficult to defend the rule [i.e., the so-called rule of restrictive 
interpretation] on a basis of logic.  Every treaty obligations limits the 
sovereign powers of a State.  [I]f a so-called rule of interpretation is 
applied to restrict the obligation of one party, a sovereign State, it 
reduces the reciprocal benefit or ‘consideration’ due to the other party, 
also a sovereign State, which seems to me to be absurd.188 
 
      Moreover, at the time of China’s accession to the WTO, Lennard foresaw 
the contradiction that in dubio mitius would create if it were to be applied to 
an agreement such as an Accession Protocol, which is inherently one-sided in 
that it imposes special burden on one side (China) as the ‘price of admission’ 
to the WTO.189  For him, “[i]t can therefore be argued that too blindly 
following maxims such as in dubio mitius, and construing ambiguities in favor 
of the WTO aspirant, could dilute the accession requirements and 
inadvertently reduce the ‘price of admission’ to the WTO.”190 
(c) An Obsolete Concept 
 
      Numerous commentators have considered in dubio mitius an obsolete 
principle since Lauterpacht’s prediction in 1958 that the rule of restrictive 
interpretation would die out.191 As mentioned earlier, McNair corroborated 
this view by stating that the “so-called rule of restrictive interpretation . . . is 
believed to be now of declining importance and the time may be not far 
distant when it will disappear from the books.”192 Christian Tomuschat 
emphasized that “[t]o date, in legal doctrine there remain hardly any voices 
                                                          
187
 John H. Jackson, The WTO dispute settlement system after ten years: the first 
decade’s promises and challenges, in YASUHEI TANIGUCHI, ALAN YANOVICH & JAN 
BOHANES, THE WTO IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: DISPUTE SETTLEMENT, 
NEGOTIATIONS, AND REGIONALISM IN ASIA 23 (Cambridge University Press, 2007).  
From the same author, see The Changing Fundamentals of International Law and 
Ten Years of the WTO, 8(1) J. INT. ECON. LAW 14 (2005) (noting that “[o]lder 
concepts [i.e., in dubio mitius], often resorting to nation-state sovereignty ideas, 
frequently run the risk of disabling the ability of some institutions to function 
effectively in carrying out their purposes.”) 
188
 MCNAIR, supra, n.____, at 765.  
189
 See Michael Lennard, Interpreting China’s Accession Protocol: a case study in 
anti-dumping, in DEBORAH CASS ET AL., CHINA AND THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: 
ENTERING THE NEW MILLENNIUM 402 (Cambridge University Press, 2003)  
190
 Id. at 403.  
191
 See Knox, supra, n.____. 
192
 MCNAIR, supra, n.____, at 765.  
39 In the Name of Sovereignty? [2009 
 
claiming that in dubio mitius belongs to the routinely applicable canons of 
interpretation in international law.”193  Rudolf Bernhardt noted that in dubio 
mitius “is no longer relevant, it is neither mentioned in the Vienna Convention 
nor has it been invoked in the recent jurisprudence of international courts and 
tribunals.  Treaty obligations are in case of doubt and in principle not to be 
interpreted in favor of State sovereignty.”194  More recently, John Knox 
summarized these views by concluding: 
 
Although the Permanent Court of International Justice regularly cited 
the rule, it made clear that it would use it only as a last resort, and in 
practice almost never used it at all.  Lauterpacht predicted in 1958 that 
the rule was dying out, and he appears to have been right. The only 
decision by the International Court of Justice (and the only post-1963 
decision of any kind) the Appellate Body cited in Hormones in favor 
of the rule was Nuclear Tests, in which the ICJ said that it would apply 
a restrictive interpretation to unilateral statements limiting a state’s 
freedom of action, a situation that does not raise Lauterpacht’s concern 
regarding the loss of reciprocal benefits.195 
 
     However, these statements must be read with caution. Lauterpacht and 
McNair examined the relevance of in dubio mitius before the AB’s report in 
EC – Hormones.  Tomuschat and Bernhardt overlooked the aforesaid AB’s 
report.  As for Knox, he undermined its significance by drawing his 
conclusion from the perspective of the ICJ, notwithstanding the perspicacity 
of his reasoning.  
2. Competing Canons of Interpretation 
(a) The Supremacy of the Principle of Effectiveness  
 
      Several prominent legal scholars have seen in the principle of 
effectiveness or effet utile, also called ut res magis valeat quam pereat, a 
principle of treaty interpretation superior to that of in dubio mitius.  Thus, 
after noting the mutual incompatibility of these two principles,196 Lauterpacht 
stated that “[w]hile, in the decisions of international tribunals, the doctrine of 
restrictive interpretation of treaties limiting the sovereignty of states has been 
no more than a form of words, the principle of effectiveness has played a 
prominent and ever-growing part in the administration of international 
law.”197  Similarly, Antonio Cassese noted: 
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[T]he authors of the Vienna Convention set great store by the principle 
of ‘effectiveness’ (ut res magis valeat quam pereat), whereby a treaty 
must be given an interpretation that enables its provision to be 
‘effective and useful’, that is, to have the appropriate effect.  This 
principle is plainly intended to expand the normative scope of treaties, 
to the detriment of the old principle whereby in case of doubt 
limitations of sovereignty were to be strictly interpreted.198 
 
 Cottier found that in dubio mitius was superseded by another principle of 
interpretation (i.e, good faith), stating: 
 
International agreements and obligations no longer are to be 
constructed in accordance wit the rule of in dubio mitius, but in 
accordance with good faith, as expressed in Article 31(1) of the 
Vienna Convention on Treaties.  Treaty provisions must be interpreted 
according to ‘good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be 
given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its 
object and purpose.’199 
 
      The case law of the WTO seems to prove these commentators right, for we 
described earlier the major cases in which the principle of effectiveness 
played a significant role.200  Therefore, would the AB have consecrated the 
teleological approach to treaty interpretation?  It would not be the first 
international court to engage in this direction, as Pierre Klein and Philippe 
Sands noted: 
 
[I]t is clear that the case law of some of these international courts and 
tribunals, in particular the I.C.J. and the ECJ, indicates a tendency 
towards seeking to ensure that the approach to which is relied upon 
will assure the effectiveness of the organization.  This requires careful 
consideration of the object and purposes of the organization, by 
reference to what has been referred to as a ‘teleological approach.’201  
 
      Paola Gaeta drew a similar conclusion in the context of international 
criminal law by finding that: 
 
[T]reaties in contemporary international law can be construed more 
liberally than in the past, when the dogma of state sovereignty was a 
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dominant feature in the international community. Nowadays the 
application of the principle of restrictive interpretation, whereby 
limitations on state sovereignty cannot be presumed or inferred by 
implication (in dubio mitius), is subject to other, more liberal 
principles and criteria (i.e., it may be applied only when resort to those 
other principles and criteria have failed).202 
(b) All Canons of Interpretation Are Equal  
 
      One must not forget that the arguments made in favor of the principle of 
effectiveness by the advocates of the teleological approach to treaty 
interpretation have been questioned by other prominent legal scholars on the 
basis of this principle’s intrinsic value and the key question of the choice 
between conflicting canons of interpretation.  Ian Brownlie noted that “[t]he 
principle of effective interpretation is often invoked, and suffers from the 
same organic defects as the principle of restrictive interpretation.”203   
      Having already exposed the critical work of Fitzmaurice in this area, this 
article will now turn to the views expressed by Julius Stone vis-à-vis what he 
called the “competition between the doctrines of ‘effectiveness’ and of 
‘restrictive interpretation.’”204 He demonstrated that the principle of 
effectiveness was not a panacea, stating: 
 
[E]ven if the “effect” of a treaty were a known entity, its claim to 
paramountcy would still be confronted by an older and still cherished 
canon tending to opposite results.  This is that treaty obligations must 
be construed restrictively, in favour of sovereignty; so that provisions 
which might or might not impose obligations on States, or which 
might impose greater or lesser obligations, shall be construed so as to 
impose no obligation, or the lesser obligation, as the case may be.  
This latter principle will obviously tend to conflict with that of 
maximizing the treaty’s effect whenever (as is usually the case) such 
“effect” depends on the creation of obligations for States.  The 
interpreter, therefore, usually has available competing canons of 
interpretation on the undisputed authority of which he can impose or 
refuse to impose obligations in a doubtful case.  And since no canon 
dictates the choice between the conflicting canons, the choice may 
endorse rather than dictate the conclusion reached.205 (emphasis 
added) 
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      This freedom of the treaty interpreter embodied in Stone’s last sentence 
regarding the lack of canon governing conflicting canons of interpretation 
could explain the discretion and ease with which the AB in EC – Hormones 
felt itself entitled to defer to national sovereignty by acknowledging in dubio 
mitius. 
(c) The Opportunistic Use of Canons of Interpretation  
 
      The uncertainty revolving around canons of interpretation has generated 
speculation about the scope of in dubio mitius, for Jackson noted that “the 
concept [i.e., in dubio mitius] has been embraced, incidentally by certain 
specific special interest advocacy groups, particularly inside the beltway in 
Washington, D.C., and one might imagine where that is coming from if one 
watches what is going on in the U.S. Congress.”206   
      To this end, consider Caroline Henckels’s argument according to which 
the precautionary approach (i.e., the application of the precautionary 
principle) would have allowed the panel in EC – Biotech207 to reconcile the 
principle of effectiveness with the principle of in dubio mitius.  She found 
that:  
 
Unlike the Panel’s narrow reading of art 5.7, this approach [i.e., the 
precautionary approach] would give effect to the principle of 
effectiveness — that is, if a treaty provision is open to two different 
interpretations, one rendering the provision nugatory, the effective 
interpretation should be adopted.  The approach also gives effect to the 
principle of in dubio mitius, whereby an ambiguous treaty term should 
be interpreted in such a way as to interfere less with a state’s 
autonomy, or to be less onerous to the party who assumes an 
obligation — a principle adopted by the Appellate Body in EC — 
Hormones.  It would require Panels and the Appellate Body to show 
greater deference to the regulatory authority of members where there is 
a legitimate nexus between the SPS Agreement measure and the 
Member’s avowed policy objective, as long as the purpose is non-
discriminatory — particularly in cases where there is low certainty and 
low consensus with respect to the level of risk posed by a particular 
product or technology.  Broadly speaking, therefore, the precautionary 
principle in this context would enable Members to act with greater 
                                                          
206
 John H. Jackson, The Varied Policies of International Juridical Bodies - 
Reflections on Theory and Practice, 25(4) MICH. J. INT'L L. 874 (2004).  
207
 Panel Report, European Communities – Measures Affecting the Approval and 
Marketing of Biotech Products (EC – Biotech), WT/DS291/R, WT/DS292/R, 
WT/DS293/R, adopted 29 September 2006.  
43 In the Name of Sovereignty? [2009 
 
flexibility than would be possible under the interpretation given by the 
Panel in EC — Biotech.208 
B. The AB’s Judicial Self-Restraint 
 
      Several scholars strived to excuse the AB’s judicial self-restraint in EC – 
Hormones, considering it almost a mistake of youth.  Lennard observed that 
the AB sought to not “overly impinge on 'State sovereignty' or overstep its 
perceived role,”209 because it was “in more of a cautious jurisdiction and 
confidence-building phase than, for example, the European Union institutions 
and most other legal tribunals.”210 (emphasis added)  Robert Howse 
understood the reliance of the AB on in dubio mitius “as the subsidiarity 
aspect of institutional sensitivity.”211  Others have acknowledged the 
application of in dubio mitius by the AB without drawing any partisan 
conclusions, Matthias Oesch noting that “the case law to date reveals that 
panels and the Appellate Body have in general not assumed for themselves a 
too active role in interpreting and construing ambiguities and open-textured 
norms contrary to national interests.”212  Only Robert Hudec saw in the AB’s 
decision the deliberate and ‘responsible’ choice to ensure its survival. 
1. The ‘Responsibility’ of the AB: Hudec’s Legacy 
 
 Hudec considered the deference to national sovereignty expressed in the 
first decisions of the AB the foundation guaranteeing the existence of this 
court, which for him had been “taken for granted.”213  He observed that 
government had viewed these decisions “as competent, conservative, and 
‘responsible.’”214  Thus, with respect to the decision of the AB in EC – 
Hormones to apply in dubio mitius, Hudec noted: 
 
The principle of in dubio mitius is a well respected canon of treaty 
interpretation, but like most canons (and counter-canons) its role in 
treaty interpretation is a matter of how forcefully it is applied. Given 
the expected difficulty in securing government compliance with the 
new WTO disputes procedure, one might expect that the Appellate 
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Body would give considerable emphasis to this canon, in an effort to 
assure governments that the WTO's new and stronger enforcement 
powers would be limited to obligations that governments have clearly 
and knowingly adopted. Until the Hormones case, however, the 
Appellate Body decisions had not gone out of their way to give this 
assurance. The earlier decisions did not seem to have been 
significantly narrowed by explicit application of in dubio mitius 
reasoning.215 
 
      Hudec knew that his work on the early years of the AB and the AB’s 
reports themselves during that period would be challenged, for he predicted 
that “[a]lthough the next few years will undoubtedly produce a substantial 
body of literature criticizing some of these early rulings, that criticism will 
almost certainly not threaten the central role that the Appellate Body has 
succeeded in defining for itself.”216  If his prediction was right, was his 
conclusion correct?  In other words, has the AB reached – or will ever reach – 
the level of legitimacy allowing it to depart from its initial exercise of judicial 
self-restraint?  Did the AB need to defer to national sovereignty to establish its 
credibility?   
      To a certain extent, other international courts, such as the ECJ, have 
succeeded in freeing themselves from national sovereignty.  In Van Gend en 
Loos, the ECJ established the direct effect of the provisions of the Treaty 
establishing the European Economic Community (EEC) by declaring “the 
Community constitutes a new legal order of international law for the benefit 
of which the states have limited sovereignty rights, albeit within limited fields, 
and the subjects of which comprise not only Member States but also their 
nationals.”217  However, as Ole Spiermann noted: “[w]hen the Court [i.e., the 
ECJ] had a choice between the international principle of self-containedness 
and a less restrictive interpretation of a treaty provision or a provision 
contained in secondary legislation, it often opted for the former.”218  He 
confirmed that the ECJ has persisted in applying the principle of in dubio 
mitius by emphasizing that “when provisions are unclear and a variety of more 
or less practicable solutions are on offer, the treaty has often yielded to state 
sovereignty.”219  Similarly, we have seen that other international courts, such 
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as the ICJ, have struggled with national sovereignty since the Lotus case still 
haunts this tribunal.220  
2. The Opponents of Judicial Activism 
 
      Following in the line of Fitzmaurice’s opposition to judicial activism,221 
all of the following scholars agreed with Hudec’s position towards in dubio 
mitius, often basing their conclusions on the AB’s report in EC – Hormones 
itself. 
 
 Claus-Dieter Ehlermann and Lothar Ehring found:  
 
[A]s regards the question of the extent to which Article 17.6(ii) 
provides for a departure from the general standard of legal review, one 
must first ask whether the application of the rules of treaty 
interpretation can really result in more than one permissible 
interpretation.  If this is the case, the next question would be to what 
extent Article 17.6(ii) produces different outcomes than the generally 
applicable principle of interpretation of public international law ‘in 
dubio mitius.’222 
 
      Howse emphasized that “[a]nother consideration to keep in mind is that, 
where a legal obligation is unclear, the international law principle of in dubio 
mitius requires a treaty interpreter to adopt the reading that least restricts the 
sovereignty of a signatory state.”223 
 
      Howse and Michael Trebilcok concluded: 
 
[T]he panel adopted the complainant’s view that a narrower rather than 
broader meaning of ‘limited’ should be applied; ‘limited’ should be 
read ‘small’.  The tenor of this reasoning is exactly contrary to the 
interpretative principles established by the AB in Hormones – 
according to the AB the principle of in dubio mitius requires that 
where there are two plausible approaches to interpretation of a treaty 
provision, the treaty interpreter adopt the interpretation that is less 
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restrictive of the sovereignty of the state understanding the obligation 
in question.224  
  
 Jagdish Bhagwati considered: 
 
I have some sympathy for [the] view that the dispute settlement panels 
and the appellate court must defer somewhat more to the political 
process instead of making law in controversial matters. I was 
astounded that the appellate court, in effect, reversed long-standing 
jurisprudence on process and production methods in the Shrimp/Turtle 
case. I have little doubt that the jurists were reflecting the political 
pressures brought by the rich-country environmental NGOs and 
essentially made law that affected the developing countries 
adversely.225 
 
  Markus Krajewski said: 
 
Certain well-established principles of treaty interpretation, such as 
principles of logic and good sense, the principles of effective 
interpretation and of in dubio mitius can be applied in addition to the 
convention rules, if the circumstances or the treaty text call for it.  
The principle of in dubio mitius is of special relevance if WTO law is 
to be interpreted in deference to national regulatory choices. 
According to the Appellate Body in EC-Hormones in dubio mitius 
‘applies in interpreting treaties, in deference to the sovereignty of 
states. If the meaning of a term is ambiguous, that meaning is to be 
preferred which is less onerous to the party assuming an obligation, or 
which interferes less with the territorial and personal supremacy of a 
party, or involves less general restrictions upon the parties.226 
 
  Yoshiko Naiki acknowledged: 
 
A policy of restraint from limiting sovereignty in the interpretation of 
obligations was already confirmed by the Appellate Body in its 
previous decision, by referring to the principle of in dubio mitius in 
general international law, which provides that ‘[i]f the meaning of a 
term is ambiguous, that meaning is to be preferred which is less 
onerous to the party assuming an obligation, or which interferes less 
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with the territorial and personal supremacy of a party, or involves less 
general restrictions upon the parties.’227 
 
      And Kal Raustiala found that “[t]he interpretation of a silent text would 
likely be construed subject to the principle of in dubio mitius.”228  
C. In Dubio Mitius: A Concept Specific to Certain Legal Areas 
1. The Application of In Dubio Mitius in Human Rights 
 
     Inasmuch as international human rights treaties guarantee effective 
protection of individual freedoms, it appears logical that legal scholars 
specialized in this area have refuted the application of in dubio mitius in 
international law in order to prevent States from jeopardizing such rights.  As 
Shiyan Sun noted with respect to the possible ratification of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) by China, “the main object 
and purpose of the human rights treaties such as the ICCPR are to protect and 
promote the rights of individuals instead of State sovereignty.”229  Similarly, 
Bernhardt said: 
 
Every effective protection of individual freedoms restricts State 
sovereignty, and it is by no means State sovereignty which in case of 
doubt has priority.  Quite to the contrary, the object and purpose of 
human rights treaties may often lead to a broader interpretation of 
individual rights on the one hand and restrictions on State Activities on 
the other.230 
  
      However, would the same commentators still challenge in dubio mitius if 
they were defending human rights that would be better protected at the 
domestic or regional level?  
      Furthermore, consider Catherine Button’s attempt to apply in dubio mitius 
in the WTO for health cases: 
 
Given that some standard of review must be applied even though it has 
not been explicitly stipulated in he texts, there is no basis o which to 
suppose that panels could not, without authorization, accord the 
findings of national authorities any deference.  In fact, this argument is 
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the more tenable as it is in keeping with the in dubio mitius principle 
applied by the Appellate Body in the Hormones case, on the basis that 
it is less onerous to the parties.  All of which is not to say that the Anti-
Dumping Agreement’s standard of review should be used in health 
cases–the point is simply that, if a similar standard were justified, 
based on the applicable texts and the balance of authority between the 
Member and the WTO that they embody, the mere fact of Article 17.6 
existence should not preclude the adoption of that level of 
deference.231 
2. The Application of In Dubio Mitius to Exceptions Provisions 
 
     There exists a doctrinal debate about the application of in dubio mitius to 
exceptions provisions inserted in international agreements.  On the one hand, 
Asif Qureshi, quoting the authors of Oppenheim's International Law, 
observed that courts strictly interpret exceptions imposed on a State 
“notwithstanding that the principle in dubio mitius may suggest that the 
exception be given a liberal interpretation.”232  This position is often 
embodied in the maxim exceptiones sunt strictissimae interpretationis, which 
is a variant of in dubio mitius.  On the other hand, Trebilcok and Howse, 
drawing an example from the WTO case law, criticized the panel in Canada – 
Pharmaceuticals233 for not applying the principle of in dubio mitius while 
interpreting the Article 30 exception of the TRIPs Agreement.234 
      On this point, consider Steve Charnovitz’s argument regarding the 
application of in dubio mitius with respect to Article XX of the GATT: 
 
I would be surprised to see a holding that a WTO Member claiming a 
GATT Article XX(g) exception is compelled to permit imports of 
products made from a foreign endangered species even when such 
commerce gives incentives for killing the species. Perhaps, the 
principle of in dubio mitius would be helpful to the adjudicator on the 
grounds that the governments drafting Article XX did not impose on 
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themselves more onerous requirements than those specifically 
mentioned in Article XX.235 
V. Conclusion  
 
      When McNair made some observations to Lauterpacht’s first project of 
resolution on the interpretation of treaties to the IIL in 1950, he compared the 
attitude of jurists towards legal interpretation to badminton, describing 
lawyers as playing with rules as if they were birdies.236  To this end, he noted 
that “[a] lawyer discovers a rule supporting his thesis somewhere; he submits 
it to the tribunal; the tribunal feels compelled to examine it and the rule thus 
becomes part of the doctrine.”237 
      Although it is difficult to ascertain whether the AB felt compelled to apply 
in dubio mitius, its report in EC – Hormones has unequivocally made this 
principle part of the doctrine and carried this vestige of the past into the 
Twenty-First Century.  As Arthur Murphy emphasized, “old maxims never 
die.”238  Not only was the AB’s justification for using in dubio mitius 
questionable, for the AB manipulated the references made in support of the 
use of this principle, but it reignited the ideological debate dividing the legal 
doctrine over the conception of what the relationship between domestic and 
international law should be.  As a result, some international courts and legal 
scholars consider in dubio mitius a threat to the future of international law, 
whereas the other part of the doctrine and the AB itself still sees in it a 
counterbalance to judicial activism.  There is no doubt that had the AB used in 
dubio mitius in the recent zeroing cases,239 for example, the outcome would 
have been quite different.  That is why, in spite of the little impact that this 
principle has had in practice, the question of the use of in dubio mitius in the 
WTO must not be postponed any longer. 
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